The Federal Courts and the American
Law Institute
PART I

David P. Curriet

"It is of first importanceto have a definition so clear cut that it
will not invite extensive threshold litigation over jurisdiction."
-The American Law Institute'
The law governing federal-court jurisdiction is unnecessarily complicated. It will become even more complicated if the American Law
Institute has its way.
Since 1959, gently prodded by Mr. Chief Justice Warren,2 the Institute has come up with proposals for comprehensive revisions of the
Judicial Code. It is refreshing to see the Institute turn its attention to
legislative drafting, for we have had a surfeit of Restatements and a
dearth of good statutes. It is also encouraging that such an influential
and intelligent body is concerned with federal jurisdiction; the subject
touches the most sensitive nerves of federalism and of the separation of
powers, as well as pervading even the humblest accident case, and the
confusion and frequent irrationality of the present law cry aloud for
correction.
Many of the ALI suggestions, especially among those not relating to
diversity jurisdiction, are desirable advances. But in seeking to make
the law of jurisdiction rational the Institute has too often ignored its
own excellent principle, quoted above, that the law should be easy to
apply. Jurisdiction should be as self-regulated as breathing; the principal job of the courts is to decide whether the plaintiff gets his money,3
and litigation over whether the case is in the right court is essentially
a waste of time and resources.
I recognize that important policies such as the desirability of a federal
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. This is the first installment of a twopart article. The second part will appear in the Winter 1969 Issue, Volume 36, number 2.
1 STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, pt. I, at 72
(Official Draft 1965) [Hereinafter cited as OFFICAL DRAFT].
2 See OFFicIL DRAFT, pt. I, at vii.
8 Or his injunction, or his divorce, and so on; but let us not quibble.
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forum for the vindication of federal rights or respect for legitimate state
interests underlie the delineation of federal jurisdiction. When the
choice of forum seems likely to make a substantial difference in the outcome of a case, as, for example, in prosecutions of civil-rights workers
for demonstrations in Mississippi, 4 detailed attention to the particular
case may be warranted. But since Erie R.R. v. Tompkins5 the instances
in which a substantial difference is predictable have been relatively few;
in determining diversity jurisdiction, for example, it may be less important to assure disposition of each case in strict accord with jurisdictional
policy than to avoid threshold litigation over the place of trial.
Maintaining our parallel state and federal court systems is an expensive habit, for it makes some jurisdictional litigation inevitable. Neither
Australia nor Canada has so serious a problem; both federations seem to
get along well enough by leaving most of the business of trial and initial
appeal to state or provincial courts, with a federal court of last resort
open to correct errors and to maintain uniformity. 6
The ALI, prudently, makes no attempt to emulate the Australian
or Canadian experience. Despite the views of Mr. Justice Story,7 it
seems to be generally accepted that Congress could eliminate the dual
system by abolishing all inferior federal courts; 8 but Congress is not
about to do it. Because of persistent state-federal hostilities, historically
more acute here than in Australia or in Canada, we do not seem to have
4 See Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights:
Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA.
L. REV. 793, 794-9 (1965).
5 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
6 Some original federal jurisdiction, however, is vested in the Exchequer Court of
Canada, and in the Australian High Court, Commonwealth Industrial Court, Federal
Court of Bankruptcy, and courts of the Australian Capital Territory. See Commonwealth
of Australia Constitution Act of 1900, 63 & 64 Vict., c. 12, as amended, §§ 71-80; Judiciary
Act 1903-1959 (Austl.) §§ 30, 38, 38A, 39; British North America Act of 1867, 30-31 Vict.,
c. 3, §§ 96, 99, 101; Supreme Court Act, CAN. Rv. STAT. c. 259, §§ 35, 36, 55, 57, 62 (1952);
Exchequer Court Act, CAN. REv. STAT. c. 98, §§ 17-19, 21-22, 26, 29 (1952); Z. COWEN,
FEDERAL JURMI5IMfnON IN AUSTRALIA 21, 78, 92, 96-97 (1959), finding reason for dissatisfaction
with the original jurisdiction of the High Court.
7 Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328-31 (1816).
8 See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850), upholding the power of Congress to
deny diversity jurisdiction when the plaintiff's assignor could not have sued in federal
court; H. HART & H. WECHsLER, THE FEDERAL CoURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEIM 17-18, 293
(1953), arguing that Story's position contradicts the "deliberate compromises of the Constitutional Convention"; U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1: "such inferior Courts as the Congress
may from time to time ordain and establish." General federal-question jurisdiction was
not conferred until 1875, see HART & WEcnsLER, supra, at 727-30. Arguably, however, Article
I requires that some federal trial court be open for habeas corpus. See Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965-6 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev'd on other grounds, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
See generally D. CusR.E, FEDERAL CouRTs 87-105 (1968).
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reached the point where Supreme Court review of state courts is always
adequate to assure recognition of federal rights. 9 Moreover, federal
procedures are relatively enlightened; and the life tenure, independence, respectable salary, and prestige of the federal bench have attracted, by and large, judges of relatively high caliber. Many of us
would hate to see federal courts go, for they are pretty good courtsconsidering, as Theodore Green is reputed to have said when asked
how he felt on his ninety-third birthday, the alternative.
To achieve a unitary system by abolishing the state courts, however,
is at least as unthinkable today. A constitutional amendment very
likely would be required, although the result might be approximated
by expanding diversity jurisdiction to encompass cases in which any
two opposing parties are diverse; 10 conferring a protective federalquestion jurisdiction, if that is allowable,11 over the very nearly allembracing category of cases affecting interstate commerce; 12 and making
federal jurisdiction exclusive across the board.1 3 Even if the federal
courts under such a scheme purported to follow state law, however, the
effective destruction of the state courts would entail a significant shift
in the division of federal and state lawmaking powers, for it would deprive the states of the ability to construe their own statutes and to make
common law.' 4 With both states' rights and the plums of judicial
patronage at stake, the political obstacles would be overwhelming.
Some day, perhaps, we may hope that a single system of courts can be
established to assure both a high degree of competence and independence and a local control of judicial lawmaking commensurate with
local legislative power. Appointment by the Governor, with federal
guarantees of tenure and irreducible salary, might do the trick. But the
time is not ripe.
This side of Utopia some accommodation must be made for the ef9 See Professor Amsterdam's vivid description, for example, of the performance of
Mississippi state courts in prosecutions arising out of civil-rights activities cited in note 4
supra at 794-9.
10 State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 US. 523, 530-1 (1967), established that
this would be constitutional.
11 See HART F&
WEcsL.R, supra note 8, at 371-2. This issue is discussed in text at notes
69-73 infra.
12 See Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn,
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
13 The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 429-31 (1867), sustains exclusive federal
jurisdiction.
14 See Williams, The Role of Federal Courts in Diversity Cases Involving Mineral

Resources, 13 U. KAN. L. R.v. 375, 387-8 (1965), saying that even with concurrent jurisdiction the federal courts are "winning" the "contest" over adjudicating questions of state
law in mineral cases: "[P]erhaps the leading jurist in oil and gas matters is to be found
in a federal rather than a state court.,.."
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fective operation of two sets of courts. The cases ought to be divided
between the two systems in such a way that both are given the maximum
opportunity to serve the purposes for which they exist; and the division
ought to be as easy to administer as is consistent with those purposes.
A great many improvements along these lines can be made in the existing distribution of federal and state jurisdiction, and a great many can
be made in the ALI proposals.
I proceed to the bill of particulars.
DIVERSITY JURISDICTION

1. Retention of the Jurisdiction

Of necessity the Law Institute has entered the Great Debate over
whether diversity jurisdiction should be abolished or retained. I must

say I find this controversy rather boring; I cannot agree with Mr. Justice
Frankfurter that diversity is a great curse 15 or with Judge Parker that
it is a great blessing.16
Since Erie and Klaxon 7 the most respectable argument for diversity
jurisdiction has been that it protects outsiders from state-court dis-

crimination.'8 Only meager attempts have been made to test the
15 See Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States and State
Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520-6 (1928); Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S.
48, 53-60 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 337 U.S. 582, 650-1 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). For other negative responses
to diversity jurisdiction see R. JACKSON, THE SuPaxas COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYsrEar OF
GOVERNMENT 36-37 (1955); Doub, Time for Re-Evaluation: Shall We Curtail Diversity
Jurisdiction?44 A.B.A.J. 243 (1958); Friendly, The HistoricBasis of Diversity Jurisdiction,
41 HARv. L. RPv. 483, 510 (1928); Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
JudiciaryAct of 1789, 37 HARv. L. REv. 49, 132 (1923); Wechsler, Federal Jurisdictionand
the Revision of the JudicialCode, 13 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 234-40 (1948).
16 See Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks Upon It, 18 A.B.A.J. 433,
437-9 (1932); Parker, Dual Sovereignty and the Federal Courts, 51 Nw. U.L. REv. 407,
408-11 (1956). Accord, Taft, Possible and Needed Reforms in Administration of Justice in
Federal Courts, 8 A.B.A.J. 601, 604 (1922); Farage, Proposed Code Will Emasculate Diversity Jurisdiction,TRIAL, April-May 1966, at 30; Marbury, Why Should We Limit Federal
Diversity Jurisdiction?,46 A.B.A.J. 379, 380 (1960); Moore & Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, Present,and Future, 43 Tx. L. REv. 1 (1964).
17 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313
U.S. 487 (1941).
18 The Supreme Court has often said this is the purpose of the jurisdiction. E.g., Bank
of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347 (1816); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938); Guaranty
Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945). See also Warren, supra note 15, at 83. For the

view that the basis of diversity was the fear of state legislative action against creditors,
not of court bias against nonresidents as such, see Friendly, supra note 15, at 492-8.
One might of course advocate overruling Klaxon and retaining diversity jurisdiction to
assure impartial administration of a new federal doctrine of choice among state laws;
this would involve the considerations respecting original federal-question jurisdiction,
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factual accuracy of this argument by the tools of social science,19 and it
is not obvious either that prejudice against nonresidents is a terrible
21
problem now20 or that federal jurisdiction is an effective antidote.
My hunch is that it is too early to say that xenophobia has disappeared
from the American scene, but I can appreciate the argument that the
danger of bias is not great enough to justify the burden on federal
courts and the interference with state prerogative that diversity jurisdiction entails.
Like an Orwellian broken record, John P. Frank has unabashedly
argued for diversity jurisdiction on a broader basis: State Courts Bad,
Federal Courts Good.22 I have come to modulate my original horrified
which will be discussed in Part II of this article. Despite Erie's well-grounded constitutional
arguments, Congress probably has power under the Commerce Clause and the federalquestion provision in Article III to repeal the Rules of Decision Act and reinstate an
enlarged federal common law in diversity cases, see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Such a sweeping shift in lawmaking powers, responsive to no
greater pressure than a general bias in favor of the federal government and a desire to
avoid choice-of-law problems, is not to be expected in a revision of the Judicial Code.
19 Two recent, modest studies involved questioning attorneys about why they chose to
take diversity cases to federal courts. See Summers, Analysis of Factors that Influence Choice
of Forum in Diversity Cases, 47 IA. L. REv. 933, 937-8 (1962), finding that only 4.3% of
responding Wisconsin lawyers even mentioned bias and that "geographical convenience,
availability of broader discovery procedures, and the notion that federal juries render
higher awards are the most frequently indicated reasons for preferring a federal court";
Note, The Choice Between State and Federal Court in Diversity Cases in Virginia, 51
VA. L. REv. 178, 179-84 (1965), reporting that 60% of responding Virginia attorneys assigned
bias against out-of-state plaintiffs as a reason for choosing the federal court.
It is not altogether clear what questions the researcher should put in attempting to
assess the bias problem. To ask attorneys why they go to federal court is to obtain their
opinion as to the existence of bias; if bias in fact is minimal, perhaps we should reconsider
the desirability of burdening the system with diversity jurisdiction in order to allay
groundless apprehensions. To ask state-court judges and prospective jurors whether they
would be fair to out-of-state litigants seems to my lay eye to invite unreliable responses;
who wants to brand himself a bigot? Subtle questionnaires like those employed to test
anti-Semitism (see T. W. ADoRuo, ET AL., TIE AurTorrARIAN PEFsONALrrY 57-101 (1950))
might be devised, or an attempt made to determine by examining judgments whether
outsiders lose a disproportionate number of cases in state courts or fare better in federal.
But would the findings be worth the trouble?
20 Perhaps the situation most persuasive to Northern minds is that of a Yankee litigant
in a Southern court. But even in this context New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 278 Ala.
656, 144 So. 2d 25 (1962), rev'd, 876 U.S. 254 (1964), was an atypical case because of its
direct connection with the racial issue. A grant of jurisdiction in suits between citizens

of different states arising out of a controversy over Negro rights might take care of most
cases of probable bias.
21 It might be more effective if federal jurors were drawn from districts embracing parts

of two or more states and if federal judges were more often assigned duties away from
home. But there is some protection because the jurors are drawn from a fairly large
district, because the judges are relatively free from political pressures, and possibly even
because of the subconscious influence of being a part of the national government.
22 See Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YAx L.J. 7 (1963); Frank.
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reaction to Mr. Frank's position, for what he proposes is no more a
perversion of constitutional authority than is the common use of the
tax and commerce powers to combat such nuisances as machine guns,
prostitution, and child labor;23 I am left to confess that, like Chief
Justice Taft,24 I am not yet wholly reconciled to Champion v. Ames.25
In brief, I cannot view either the retention or the abolition of diversity jurisdiction with appreciable choler. But after studying the Institute's proposals and essaying to improve on them, I am tempted to
say that the impossibility of drafting sensible and workable limits for
diversity cases is reason enough to abandon the jurisdiction.
The slightly sadistic will find it entertaining to follow the Institute's
26
tortuous path to the conclusion that diversity ought to be retained.
The commentary begins with a ringing denunciation of the jurisdiction: "So long as federal courts continue to decide cases arising under
state law without the possibility of state review, the state's judicial
power is less extensive than its legislative power; this is an undesirable
interference with state autonomy." 27 Not only is diversity bad for the
states; it is bad for the federal courts too, for in diversity cases the
federal courts lack "the creative function which is essential to their
dignity and prestige." 2 Nor can diversity be justified today by its
original policies of encouraging free movement of capital among the
states or of enhancing the prestige of the federal government; the
latter goal was long ago achieved, and there is no longer any reason to
fear that an inability to take refuge in federal court will deter interstate
investment. "Proof that diversity jurisdiction fulfilled a useful purpose
at some time in the past is of course not proof that it continues to do
so."

29

Then, abruptly, the Reporters land a swift right to their own jaw,
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction-An Opposing View, 17 So. CAR. L. REv. 676 (1965). The

logic of Mr. Frank's position suggests not only that diversity jurisdiction be retained but
that federal courts be opened to their fullest constitutional extent; to limit the proposal
to preserving the existing jurisdiction is an exercise in Realpolitik.
23 See United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), overruled in other respects in
Marchett! v. United States 390 U.S. 39 (1968) (gambling); Sonzinsky v. United States, 300

U.S. 506 (1937) (guns); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941), overruling
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (child labor); Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S.
308 (1913) (Mann Act).
24 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922) (child labor).
25 188 US. 321 (1903) (lottery). Indeed the diversity proposition is by far the easier to
accept, for there is no doubt that Congress has power to create jurisdiction of Article III
cases regardless of its reasons for doing so.
26 OFkFCAL DRAr, pt. I, at 47-56.
27 Id. at 47.
28 Id.
29 Id. at 49.
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shifting the burden of proof before suggesting any present need for
diversity jurisdiction:
Ever since 1789 the federal government has pledged to travelers
away from their home states the even-handed justice of its own
courts. This pledge is so woven into the fabric of our society
that it is taken for granted. It should not lightly be withdrawn. General diversity jurisdiction should be retained
unless it can be asserted with confidence that the shortcomings
of the state court justice which originally gave rise to it no
longer exist to any significant degree. 30
Turning to the question of bias, the commentary seems first to
demolish the case for diversity jurisdiction again by declaring that
"none of the significant prejudices which beset our society today begins
or ends when a state line is traversed."31 But do not despair, gentle
reader; although racial, religious, and economic bias may operate
equally against local people, "the bias which was formerly thought to operate against out-of-staters as such seems still to exist to some degree with
respect to persons from a more distant part of the country."32 Besides,
prejudice is but one aspect of the overall problem met by diversity
jurisdiction, namely, "the possible shortcomings of state justice."3 3 For
example, when state venue provisions "localize the place of trial in
small constituencies ...justice is likely to be impeded by the provincialism of the local judge and jury, the tendency to favor one of their
own against an outsider, and the machinations of the local 'court house
gang.' ',34 In addition, "there have been in some states such infirmities
in practice and procedure as to jeopardize the fairness of adjudication,"3 5 and some metropolitan state courts "are so congested that justice
to litigants, including out-of-staters, is unconscionably delayed." 86 Concededly these difficulties may be equally present in suits between parties
from the same state; but the Institute hastens to avoid the inference that
it is embracing Mr. Frank's argument that diversity should be retained
just because federal courts are better courts:
[T]he fact that in-staters are not or cannot be similarly protected is not decisive. One obvious material difference is that
the citizen of a state, who may share in its political life, is
30
31
32
33
34

Id.

at 51.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 52.
Id.

35 Id. at 53.
386 Id.
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properly held to responsibility for its institutions, and forced
to operate within them, in ways which are inappropriate as to
the out-of-stater who has no such general opportunity to play
37
a role in having the state's system changed.
Finally, say the Reporters, diversity can be justified apart from the
actual competence or fairness of state courts, in order to prevent the
nonresident who loses a lawsuit from attributing his defeat to bias or
incompetence on the part of the state government, and thus to avoid
what "might otherwise be a source of friction and divisiveness among
the several states and their citizens."3 8 This consideration is especially
important when an alien is a party: "It is important in the relations of
this country with other nations that any possible appearance of injustice
or tenable ground for resentment be avoided." 39
If you think this is pretty complicated, you're right. I should prefer
to adhere to the straightforward notion that diversity jurisdiction exists
primarily to protect nonresidents from local prejudice. The interpleader example furnishes an additional justification, which the Institute also recognizes: Federal jurisdiction is appropriate when the
multi-state nature of the parties makes it impossible for any state court
to deal adequately with an entire controversy. 40 In alien cases, too,
there is something to the argument that the federal government should
assert control over the potential causes of diplomatic embarrassment.
If diversity is to be retained, it should be tailored to meet these
purposes.
2. The Determination of Individual Citizenship
a. The Tests of Nationality and Domicile. The ALI's basic defini41
tion of diversity cases, apart from the red flag with which it begins,
is virtually identical to the present section 1332 of Title 28:

§ 1301....
(a) Except as provided in this section and section 1302 of
this title, the district courts shall have jurisdiction, originally
or on removal, of any civil action between(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State, and foreign states or citizens or
subjects thereof; or
(3) citizens of different States and in which foreign
states or citizens or subjects thereof are additional parties;
37

Id. at 52-53.

88 Id. at 53.
39 Id. at 54.
40 See text at notes 121-50 infra.
41 See text at notes 207-23 infra.
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where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of
$10,000, exclusive of interest and costs....
(c) The word "State," as used in this chapter, includes the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and
any Territory or Possession of the United States.... 42
Except in regard to associations and personal representatives, 43 the
ALI draft, like the present statute, makes no attempt to define "citizen,"
and the traditional tests of nationality for foreign citizenship" and domicile for American, 45 while reasonably well understood, leave something to be desired. To exclude from foreign-citizen jurisdiction the
stateless person4 8 and the American living abroad, 47 as the lower courts
have done, does accord with the purpose of avoiding offense to foreign
governments; 48 but if the danger of local prejudice justifies jurisdiction
over Americans living in other American states, it surely applies to the
stateless and to the expatriate, as well.49 Indeed diversity policy would
warrant jurisdiction on foreign-relations grounds whenever one or
more of the parties is claimed as a national by a foreign country, and on
grounds of bias whenever one party is an American citizen or resident
and the other is not-as well as in some cases wholly between non42 OFFiCAL DRArr,

48
44
F.2d
45

pt. I, at 8-9.

See text at notes 74-84, 158-76 infra.
E.g., Psinakis v. Psinakis, 221 F.2d 418, 422 (3d Cir. 1955); Shoemaker v. Malaxa, 241
129 (2d Cir. 1957); Pemberton v. Colonna, 290 F.2d 220 (3d Cir. 1961).
E.g., Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624-6, (1914).
46 E.g., Shoemaker v. Malaxa, supra note 44.
47 E.g., Van der Schelling v. U.S. News & World Report, Inc., 213 F. Supp. 756, 761
(E.D. Pa. 1963), holding that "subjects" of a foreign state were aliens who "owed allegiance
to a sovereign monarch," as distinguished from aliens who were "citizens of a democracy."
48 So does the principle, see Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., 215 F.2d 547, 553 (2d Cir. 1954),
that the law of a foreign state determines whether a person is its citizen. Less satisfactory
in this light is the holding in Klausner v. Levy, 83 F. Supp. 599, 600 (E.D. Va. 1949), that
a citizen of mandated Palestine was outside the jurisdiction: He was not a British citizen,
though entitled to British diplomatic protection, because Palestine had power to confer
its own citizenship; but Palestine was not a "foreign state" because it had not been
"formally recognized by the executive branch." Executive non-recognition does not imply
an indifference to irritations caused by state courts. Better are the Murarka holding that
India became a "foreign state" substantially before its independence, 215 F.2d at 552, and
the granting of permission to a Cuban agency to sue in Banco Nacional v. Sabbatino, 376
US. 398, 408-12 (1964), despite a break in diplomatic relations.
49 And also, very likely, to a suit between resident and non-resident aliens. But see
Cuozzo v. Italian Line, 168 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), denying jurisdiction because an
alien resident was not a "citizen" of an American state. This decision follows rather
logically from such holdings as Psinakis v. Psinakis, supra note 44, which held a resident
alien diverse to a citizen of the state where he resided. But policy suggests jurisdiction
would be proper in both cases: The resident alien is likely to be favored in a contest with
a total outsider and disfavored when opposing a local citizen, so he arguably should be
held a citizen of both his state of residence (or domicile) and his country of nationality,
diverse (but cf. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, text at note 94 infra) to citizens of either.
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residents. In order to avoid complexity in drafting or interpretation,
one might therefore propose jurisdiction over all cases in which a nonresident or noncitizen of the United States is a party. 50
In light of the tenuous basis for diversity jurisdiction in any case,
however, the complications which would be engendered by such a
change counsel retention of the simple, established test of nationality.
While the American abroad could easily be held a foreign citizen or
subject, the man without a country, like the suit between two aliens, 51
cannot be comfortably fitted into the language of either the existing
statute or the Judiciary Article of the Constitution. If jurisdiction of
such cases is to be sustained, it can only be the result of a statutory
change supported as a grant of protective federal-question jurisdiction
or of jurisdiction outside Article III; both these theories rely on Congressional authority over foreign affairs, and neither has been approved
to date by the Supreme Court.52 Thus expansion of jurisdiction to encompass all international cases falling within diversity policy would
entail serious constitutional litigation at the outset. Moreover, it would
import into the foreign-citizen cases the difficult test of domicile or
residence that complicates the present scheme in interstate diversity
cases.
Domicile is an unsatisfactory test for American state citizenship both
because it is difficult to determine and because it too frequently bears
no relation to the probability of bias. John L. Lewis was held diverse
to a Virginian, although he had lived in Virginia for thirty years, because he still voted in Illinoi. 53 A Michigan woman who had married
an Illinois soldier in Wyoming and returned to Michigan after a few
weeks while he was sent overseas was held diverse to a citizen of Michigan because a wife takes the domicile of her husband.5 4 The notions
that one may be a domiciliary of a place one has never been,5 5 and that
one retains an old domicile long after abandoning it until a new one is
acquired, 56 are off base in terms of possible prejudice; and the tests for
G0 The probably rather rare case of dual American and foreign citizenship could most
simply be dealt with by treating the litigant as an American: In accord with Strawbridge
v. Curtiss, text at note 94 infra, his additional foreign citizenship seems unlikely to create
substantial danger of bias. To open the federal courts to Americans claimed by their
countries of origin, on the basis of a fear of foreign embarrassment, seems excessive.
51 See Hodgson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 303 (1809), limiting the alien-a-party
statute on constitutional grounds.
52 See text at notes 65-73 infra.
53 Lewis v. Splashdam By-Products Corp., 233 F. Supp. 47, 49 (W.D. Va. 1964).
54 Seegers v. Strzempek, 149 F. Supp. 35, 37 (E.D. Mich. 1957).
55 See R STATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 14, illustration 1 (1934),
56 See id. § 15(2): "To acquire a domicile of choice, a person must establish a dwellingplace with the intention of making it his home." The court justifiably rebelled in Pannill
v. Roanoke Times Co., 252 F, 910 (W.D. Va. 1918), refusing to hold a former Californian
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determining domicile of people who have concurrent connections with
two states-such as the commuter 57 and the modern Proserpina who
spends summers in New York and winters in Florida 5s -are highly
arbitrary. On the other hand domicile provides rather well for the
serviceman or college student away from home, 59 for he seems not
unlikely to be considered an outsider by some members of the community where he is stationed.
Here, as always, it is easier to criticize than to construct a satisfactory
alternative. Bias is a slippery enough concept at best, and an attempt to
isolate its sources becomes largely fantasy in dealing with people associated with more than one state. Because personal contacts seem more
relevant to possible bias than a probably unknown domiciliary intention, some concept of settled residence seems a better test than domicile;
it would take care of freakish cases in which a person is held a domiciliary of a place with which he has no present connection. But residence
remains quite arbitrary in cases like those of Proserpina or of the commuter; it might dictate the less desirable result in the case of the student
or soldier; and residence, like domicile, would be beastly to define.
Voting registration, if it were universal among adults, would be accurate enough in light of its ease of application; automobile registration
would be no solution for those without vehicles or with registrations in
more than one state. Possibly the most universal hallmark would be the
address one places on one's annual income tax return. Unfortunately
there is no assurance that this address corresponds at all with the facts;
it could easily be jimmied to produce or to defeat diversity; and, most
significantly, not everybody files a return. A statutory test in terms of
alternative indices could be devised, taking as conclusive the first available item in a list such as the following: voting registration, automobile
registration, address on tax return, address filed with draft board,
address filed with welfare agency. Absent any of these, the relatively
rare remaining cases could be determined by the traditional tests of
who had been wandering about for years with no intention to return still a Californian.
The result was to refuse jurisdiction despite the danger of bias, for the other party was
a citizen of the forum state. A better reflection of diversity policy, but of questionable
constitutionality, would allow jurisdiction of suits between persons who are not citizens
of the same state.
57 Home, not business, is decisive under the REsrATEMENT, §§ 12, 13 & comment f.
58 Intention governs, according to the RESTATEMENT, § 15.
59 There is a tendency to treat such people as only visitors where they are stationed,
in contexts such as divorce. E.g., Klingler V. Klingler, 254 S.W.2d 817 (Tex. Civ. App.
1953). This is due partly to the often coerced nature of a soldier's or jailbird's presence,
see RESrATEMENT § 21, and partly to an unwillingness to accept unsubstantiated statements
of intention when the litigant has much to gain by proving a local domicile.
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domicile or of residence or excluded from the jurisdiction for lack of an
easy determining factor.60
Such a test, while one hopes it would prove easy to administer, is
embarrassingly complicated. Moreover, the present domicile test yields
for most people a simple answer, and a change would invite litigation
where there is rather little today. Until an easy test suggests itself,
therefore, I cannot blame the ALI for leaving the statute uninformative
on the issue of citizenship; but I would hope that the courts in problem
cases would pay less heed to intention and more to physical facts than
is suggested by the traditional concept of domicile.6 1
b. The District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Territories.The
Institute accepts the current extension of diversity jurisdiction to
citizens of the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Territories
and proposes to include citizens of American Possessions as well. This
jurisdiction was upheld as to District of Columbia citizens in the
peculiar Tidewater 2 case, which seems unlikely to be overruled despite
the inability of the Supreme Court to agree upon a rationale. I fully
agree with Justices Rutledge and Murphy in that case that the word
"State" in Article III's diversity provisions is literally broad enough to
encompass any geographical entity such as the District of Columbia,6 3
and that the words should be construed to include the District in order
to effectuate their purpose of safeguarding outsiders against possible
prejudice. This reasoning, the ALI and I agree, is equally applicable
to Territories and Possessions and has additional force in the case of
Puerto Rico, whose current Commonwealth status gives it a measure
of self-government not unlike that of the states and has been held to
bring Puerto Rico within some statutory jurisdictional provisions applying in terms only to states.64 But this argument, as to the District of
00 Alternatively, persons connected with more than one state could be held diverse to
citizens of neither, by analogy to the ALI's proposal for corporations, see text at notes
177-99 infra. This would leave, however, a serious problem of deciding what constitutes
a sufficient connection.
61 The Restatement tests of domicile, long discredited even in the conflicts field
because of their erroneous premise that a single criterion will serve equally well a multitude
of different policies, see authorities cited in R. CRA7-TON & D. CURm, CONFror OF LAws
42-48 (1968), were not formulated with diversity jurisdiction in mind and should not be
taken as determinative.
02 National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
03 There is no rigid requirement that the word "state" be given the same meaning in
various sections of the Constitution. Compare Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 177
(1869) (corporation not a "citizen" under Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV)
with Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 814, 328-9 (1854), treating a
corporation as if it were a citizen under Article III by invoking the patently unreasonable
conclusive presumption that all shareholders were citizens of the incorporating state.
64 Rosso v. Puerto Rico, 226 F. Supp. 688, 693 (D.P.R. 1964) (28 U.S.C. § 2283, which
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Columbia at least, proved unacceptable to seven of the nine Justices
deciding Tidewater.
Justices Jackson, Black, and Burton sustained the District of Columbia provision in Tidewater without regard to Article III. Instead, they
upheld the provision as an exercise of Congress's Article I power to
govern the District. This position is somewhat more difficult to embrace; it is clear enough, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter objected, that
Article III was intended as a limitation on the powers of the federal
courts. But the reasons for this limitation were two: federalism and the
separation of powers. According to conventional theory, authority to
decide abstract or nonjudicial questions would compromise the independence of the judges and burden them with tasks they are poorly
equipped to perform; 65 while decision of nonfederal, nonmaritime
cases between citizens of the same state would infringe state rights. 66
Significantly, neither of these points is relevant to Tidewater: The case
was certainly judicial, and it is difficult to argue that trying cases for
the District of Columbia is a function of peculiarly state concern. Unfortunately this may prove only that there ought to be jurisdiction over
District of Columbia citizen cases, not that there can be; for the premise
of the Constitution, confirmed by the much-maligned tenth amendment, is that the federal government may exercise only powers conferred upon it by the Constitution: Unless the case comes within the
judicial power defined in that document it cannot be entertained.
With this a majority of the Court in Tidewater agreed.
On balance, however, I think Mr. Justice Jackson was right and the
majority wrong: It is not necessary to read Article III to incapacitate
Congress from governing the District of Columbia in light of the broad
grant of power over the District in Article 1.67 Once accepted, the Jacklimits injunctions against proceedings in "State" courts); see Mora v. Mejias, 206 F.2d 377,
386-8 (lst Cir. 1953) (suggesting without deciding that Puerto Rico may be a "State"

within the three-judge provision in 28 U.S.C. § 2281).
65 See the compilation of arguments against advisory opinions in D. CuRRE,

FEDm AL

CoU'rs 9 (1968).
66 See The Genesee Chief, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 452 (1851).
67 Cf. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828), and Dynes v. Hoover, 61
U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1858), declaring that territorial and military tribunals need not meet
the tenure and salary requirements of Article III because other Constitutional provisions
could be read to authorize the exercise of judicial power. I think these decisions were
unfortunate; they led to a situation in which it appeared that Congress could abolish the
tenure of all federal trial judges, see Crowell v. Benson, 285 US. 22 (1932); Ex parte
Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929). Fortunately the independence of the judges seems to
have been strongly reaffirmed by Williams v. United States, 289 US. 553, 580-1 (1933),
which is based on the plain holding that powers falling within Article III cannot be given
to judges without tenure, and by Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 533-4 (1962), which
declares that litigants in Article III courts are constitutionally entitled to Article III judges,
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son theory is equally applicable to Territories and Possessions since
Article IV gives Congress power to legislate for those areas comparable
to the Article I grant respecting the District of Columbia. Puerto Rico,
on the other hand, presents something of a problem; for Congress in
approving Commonwealth status appears to have given up its authority
over local Puerto Rico affairs6 8-if it has constitutional power to do so.
The protective-jurisdiction theory of Professors Hart and Wechsler
allows one to reach Mr. Justice Jackson's result without conceding that
federal courts may be given jurisdiction outside Article III. Congress
has power to enact substantive laws governing District residents, and
cases arising under such laws would be federal-question cases within
Article III; therefore, Hart and Wechsler argue, Congress has the power
to infringe state interests to a lesser degree by creating federal jurisdiction without creating federal law 69 The Supreme Court once squarely
rejected this notion, but under rather outmoded views of the Commerce
Clause;70 and Mr. Justice Frankfurter's objection to protective jurisdiction on the ground that the greater does not always include the lesser 71
fails to persuade since it suggests no reason for not including the lesser
in this case. One possible reason is that the necessity to create substantive law acts as a brake on congressional expansion of jurisdiction,
but this sounds hollow in light of the ease with which state laws could
be adopted as the model for federal. 72 A more serious problem with the
even at trial. It is surely not to be expected after Glidden that the Supreme Court would
permit this substantial safeguard of impartial justice to be subverted by giving jurisdiction
to a separate court composed of judges dependent upon the will of the Congress or of the
President.
The cases permitting non-tenure judges of territorial and military courts are distinguishable from Tidewater because in the latter the creation of judicial power outside
Article III does not conflict with any policy embodied in the limitations of that Article.
They are cited here to show that Article III has not always been read to exhaust the
judicial powers of the United States.
68 See Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309, 313-9 (D.P.R. 1953). But the Third Circuit,
upholding the jurisdictional provision, holds that Puerto Rico is still a "Territory."
Americana of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Kaplus, 968 F.2d 431, 435-6 (3d Cir. 1966), cert. denied,
386 U.S. 943 (1967).
69 See H. HART & H. WEcuSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SqsTEf 371-2
(1953). Indeed, although they do not say why, they suggest (as in controversies involving
bankruptcy trustees) that protective jurisdiction may even include cases that Congress
could not subject to federal law.
70 The Genesee Chief, b3 U.S. (12 How.) 443, 451 (1851): "[imt would be inconsistent
with the plain and ordinary meaning of words, to call a law defining the jurisdiction of
certain courts of the United States a regulation of commerce."
71 Textile Workers Union V. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 474 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
'2
See the Assimilative Grimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1964); the long-lived Conformity Act
respecting procedure, discussed in HART & WCHISLER, supra note 69, at 584-9; Clark Distillihg Co. v. Western Md. Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917) (liquor importation). Old-fashioned fears
of improper delegation to the tates of congressional powers, see Washington v. W.C.
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protective-jurisdiction theory is the difficulty of discovering the federal
law under which, as required by Article III, the case would arise. The
bootstrap aspect of holding that the case arises under the jurisdictional
statute could be contained by holding the jurisdiction must be related
to some substantive congressional power, but this is a step beyond the
usual notion that a case arises under federal law only if the cause of
action or an ingredient of it is created by federal law, or if federal law
3
must be construed in the case.?
However shaky the constitutional basis of Tidewater, a majority
there sustained the equation of District citizens with those of the states;
the same arguments apply to the Territories and Possessions and, with
slight reservations, to Puerto Rico; the jurisdiction makes sense and is
unlikely to be very offensive to anybody; and Tidewater is therefore not
likely to be overruled. The ALI is quite right in preserving and extending this bar-sinister variant of diversity jurisdiction, if diversity is to be
preserved at all.
c. Representative Parties and Frauds on the Jurisdiction.The ALI
wants to overturn a long-standing rule regarding the citizenship of
executors and administrators 74 and to darify the present confusion
respecting guardians 75 by providing that all personal representatives
shall be deemed citizens of the same state as the person whose estate or
interests they represent.7 6 The present rule has proved a ready vehicle
for permitting litigants to manufacture or to destroy diversity at will

7

-a practice that impairs whatever state and federal interests there are
in the proper allocation of these cases, imposes the burden of adjudicaDawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924) (maritime workmen's compensation), have gone by the
board. See DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-1 (1956); Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman's
Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 321 n.29 (1955).
73 See Part II of this article, text at notes 275-90.
74 E.g., Chappedelaine v. Dechenaux, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 306, 308 (1808); Rice v. Houston,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 66, 67 (1871), holding the representative a citizen of his state of domicile.
75 Compare Fallat v. Gouran, 220 F.2d 325, 326 (3d Cir. 1955), looking to the guardian's
citizenship because he had the right to sue, with Martineau v. City of St. Paul, 172 F.2d 777,
780 (8th Cir. 1949), looking to the ward's because the action should have been brought in
his name and because, even if the foreign guardian were a proper party, the controversy
was essentially local. The closest Supreme Court authority is an ancient venue case,
Mexican Cent. Ry. v. Eckman, 187 U.S. 429, 434 (1903), which relied on state law respecting
the right to sue and which, according to Fallat, may have been superseded by Civil Rule
17(c). In any case the guardian's home may be more relevant to litigation convenience
(venue) than to bias (diversity).
76 OFFIIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 9, § 1301(b)(4).
77 See Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183, 190 (1931), in which an
administratrix had filed suit three times in state court and had each action dismissed
voluntarily after removal. Finally she resigned anti secured the appointment of an
administrator from another state, in order, the Supreme Court found, to defeat diversity.
See also Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., note 80 infra.
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tion on federal courts without regard to jurisdictional policy, and reflects poorly on the public image of the legal system. The Congress is on
record as opposing this sort of thing solidly since 1789. The famous
assignee clause 78 and the present ban on collusive or improper creation
of jurisdiction,79 which the Third Circuit at least has held inapplicable
to the most flagrant personal-representative cases,"" are well complemented by the ALI's proposal.
Some have complained, as did Hart and Wechsler of the assignee
clause,"' that the ALI's proposal throws out tyke as well as tub, since
not all appointments or assignments altering diversity are for an improper purpose.3 2 But to investigate motive in every case invites litigation, and especially in the case of the representative the reward is not
worth the effort; I see no reason to believe that there is a substantial
likelihood that the outcome of a case will be affected because of prejudice for or against an individual who has nothing to gain or lose in the
litigation.8 3 In the case of the guardian, it seems clear that any bias will
turn upon the citizenship of the ward. In the case of the decedent, it
is fair to ask whether his citizenship is relevant, since he "is the only one
in the whole wide world who literally has no interest in the proceedings";8 4 but to investigate the domicile of all beneficiaries and creditors
of the estate would unjustifiably turn the jurisdictional question into
a full-dress probate proceeding, and there is a great likelihood that
neither judge nor jury would have been aware of or influenced by the
facts so laboriously ascertained. Thus, I approve the ALI's formulation
because it is exactly as simple to administer as the existing rule, avoids
the unseemly possibility of appointments made to affect jurisdiction,
and accords far better than the present rule with the probable focus of
bias.
78 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79.

79 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1964).
80 Corabi v. Auto Racing, Inc., 264 F.2d 784, 785, 788 (3d Cir. 1959). An administratrix
had asked and received permission to resign "in order that Letters of Administration
may be granted to a non-resident" so that suit could be brought in federal court. The new
appointment was held neither "collusive" nor "improper." And the appointment of a

representative was earlier held not to be an "assignment" under the old assignee clause,
Childress v. Emory, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 642, 669 (1823).
81 H. HART&

H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEERAL SYsTEm 918 (1953).
See Farage, Proposed Code Will Emasculate Federal Jurisdiction,TRIAL, April-May
1966, at 30, 31-32.
83 Cf. McNutt v. Bland, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 8, 13-15 (1844), upholding jurisdiction of a
82

suit on behalf of New York creditors against Mississippi defendants on a sheriff's bond,
although the action had to be brought in the name of Mississippi's Governor. Nominal
parties, the Court said, could be ignored; executors and administrators were unconvincingly distinguished on the ground that they held title to estate property and controlled
the litigation.
84 Farage, supra note 82, at 32.
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The ALl proposes to retain in substance the section 1359 prohibition
against joining or creating parties "improperly" or "collusively," 85
and to reinstate the assignee clause without its erstwhile virtue of administrability: The new section 1307(b) would disregard any transfer
made "to enable or to prevent the invoking of federal jurisdiction."8 16
On the other hand the Institute apparently accepts, in general,8 7 the
hornbook rules that citizenship is determined at the time of suit, and
that a motive to create or to defeat jurisdiction by changing domicile
is immaterial.8 8
Simplicity of application certainly justifies the last two rules8 9 and
raises some question as to the desirability of outlawing fraudulent
joinder or transfer. But the Institute's distinction can be defended, for
no acceptable self-administering rule suggests itself for the joinder and
transfer cases. To ignore all assignments, as before 1948, might create
hardship in cases of honest transfer and real prejudice; to accept all
parties at face value would encourage imposition at no greater cost than
the writing of a mock contract. A change of domicile, by contrast, is
ordinarily a rather extreme measure to undertake simply in order to
avoid the state courts; the notorious Nevada divorce problem is not
analogous, because since the overruling of Swift v. Tyson 0 the only
effect of diversity jurisdiction is, as was said in a related context, a
85 OFFICIAL DL-r, pt. I,at 21,
86 Id. at 21-22.

§ 1807(a).

s8 But see proposed § 1302(d), OFrcuA. DRAir, pt. I, at 12, which forbids invocation of
diversity jurisdiction (see text at notes 207-23 infra) by persons who, because of an established business or commuter relationship with the forum state, could not have invoked
the jurisdiction at the time the claim arose. The effect of this proposal would be to

prevent a litigant from obtaining access to the federal court by abandoning an established
business, a possibility that seems something less than an overwhelming opportunity for
fraud on the jurisdiction. The Reporters give no reason for this odd and complicating
provision, offering only that it "complements the two preceding subsections, which
measure the two-year period backward from the time of invocation of diversity jurisdic-

tion," id. at 77. It is perfectly possible to require two years' connection without ignoring
the fact that the connection has been terminated.
88 Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619, 624-5 (1914); Mollan v. Torrance, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 537, 539 (1824). The requirement in removal cases of diversity when the state
suit was begun as well as at the date of removal, Mansfield, Coldwater & L.M. Ry. v.
Swan, Ill U.S. 879, 381-2 (1884), may very slightly reduce the danger of contrived diversity;
but it is not a necessary result of the statutory requirement that the action be one in
which the federal court has "original jurisdiction." It complicates the inquiry upon removal without adequate justification, and it risks possible bias when the change of home is
legitimate. Its probable explanation lies in the desirability of setting jurisdiction for
good when the complaint is filed. Cf. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, discussed in Part II

of this article, text at notes 232-44.
89 In addition, citizenship at the time of suit seems more relevant to bias than citizen-

ship at the time of the transaction.
90 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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change of courtrooms and not a change of law- 1 We have got along with
the collusive-joinder provision for a long while; I suspect the result of
the ALI's new assignee clause will be not a glut of litigation but a
seldom-satisfied burden of proof.9 2 But if litigating the fraud issue does
become a burden, 93 the clause should be either abandoned or made
absolute.
3. Complete Diversity
a. The StrawbridgeRule. The ALl makes no attempt to deal with the
problem of Strawbridgev, Curtiss,94 and the statute has never done so.
The Institute doubtless assumes that by adopting the language of the
prior statute it will perpetuate the rule that diversity must be "complete"-that all plaintiffs must be diverse to all defendants. I don't see
why, if this is their intention, they do not make this rule explicit in
the statute, While it is true that everyone who calls himself a lawyer
ought to know or be able to discover the Strawbridgerule, the language
of the statute is a trap for the uneducated, and there is no virtue in
refusing to make it clear.9 5
The assumption apparently underlying Strawbridge is that the presence of Massachusetts people on both sides of a case will neutralize any
possibility of bias affecting litigants from other states. On the facts of
Strawbridge itself, this was probably a fair assumption: The suit was
brought in Massachusetts, there were Massachusetts people on both
sides, and the interests of the parties on either side were joint. It was
thus impossible for a Massachusetts court to injure a nonresident without also injuring one of its own people, and the chance of injury from
bias was probably slim. But the rule of Strawbridge has been uncritically extended beyond this type of case,9 6 and there are three situations
in which its rationale seems somewhat less compelling.
First, even if the interests are joint, the case may be different if suit
91 Van Dusen v. Barrack, 876 U.S. 612, 689 (1964) (transfer to more convenient forum).
92 See C. WRIGHT, FEERAL CouRTs 86 (1963), observing that § 1359 "has been largely

ineffective." And see the narrow interpretation of "improper" and "collusive" in Corabi
y. Au.to Racing, Inc., supra note 80, at 788.
93 A recent example of litigation over parties improperly joined to invoke jurisdiction
is Caribbean Mills, Inc. v. Kramer, 392 F.2d 387, 391 (5th Cir. 1968), holding improper
an assignment for collection. A motive to create diversity is not enough; the transfer, said
the court of appeals, must be a sham, not divesting the interest of the assignor.
94 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
95 E.g., "The district courts shall have jurisdiction of any civil action in which one
party is a citizen of a state and all parties properly joined as plaintiffs are citizens of
different states or foreign states from all parties properly joined as defendants."
96 E.g., Knoll v. Knoll, 350 F.2d 407 (10th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 909 (1966)
(suit in state where no plaintiff was citizen); Friend v. Middle At. Transp. Co., 153 F.2d
778 (2d Cir. 1946) (interests not joint).
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is brought in a state whose citizens are on only one side of the case.
For example, if Strawbridgehad been brought in Vermont, the home of
one of the defendants, a Vermont court might conceivably have gone
out of its way to benefit the lone Vermonter in the case, even though in
doing so it would have aided a stranger as well. Second, the Strawbridge
justification fails even in the state of common citizenship if the interests
are not joint. When a Massachusetts plaintiff sues the drivers of two
colliding automobiles, a Massachusetts court can satisfy its prejudices
by finding the Vermont driver negligent and exonerating the driver
from Massachusetts. 9 7 Finally, joinder of a judgment-proof local defendant will not always protect a foreigner even when the interests are
inseparable and the forum is the state of common citizenship; the jury
and judge know who will pay the joint judgment. Thus, Strawbridge
is often abused by the joinder of local employees in personal-injury
actions against out-of-state railroads, 98 or of local advertisers in an
Alabama libel suit against the New York Times. 9 If one is really concerned with providing a federal forum to protect a foreign litigant from
possible bias, a re-examination of Strawbridgeis in order along the lines
suggested.
The principal objection to this suggestion is that it is rather complicated; the present rule is at least somewhat easier to administer, and
that is no small matter in dealing with questions of jurisdiction. Thus
it would be better to retain Strawbridge as an absolute rule than to
modify it. Better still, however, would be to replace Strawbridge with a
rule of minimum diversity: jurisdiction whenever one properly joined
plaintiff is diverse to any proper defendant. The premise of Strawbridge
is flimsy enough at best; it applies, as I have tried to show, to only a
small percentage of the cases covered by the rule; it causes plaintiffs to
split what ought to be a single law suit into two in order to obtain
federal jurisdiction; and, as will appear below, the rule is subject to a
number of exceptions that dissipate much of its force, increase the
burden of jurisdictional litigation, give an unjustified advantage to
defendants, and induce filing of actions in forms or in forums in which
they will not ultimately be tried. 1°°
97 The ALI recognizes this and provides for removal by the defendant. See text at notes
118-9 infra; OFFicLL DaPrT, pt. I, at 87.
98 Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184 (1918).
99 Parks v. New York Times Co., 308 F.2d 474 (5th Cir. 1962).
100 The Supreme Court has recently held the Strawbridge rule not constitutionally
required, State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-1 (1967). A nondiverse
claim wholly unrelated to the diverse controversy, however, should not be held a part of

the "action" or "controversy" within either the statute or the Constitution.
Somewhat related to Strawbridge because of their assumptions that one defendant can
be counted on to protect the others are the judicial requirement that all defendants must
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The Institute proposes to preserve the obscure provision now in
section 1332(a) for jurisdiction of suits "between citizens of different
States and in which foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof are
additional parties." This section was inserted in 1948 to overturn lowercourt decisions refusing jurisdiction when a New Yorker sued a Californian and a Frenchman; literally such an action is neither between
citizens of different states nor between citizens of a state and of a foreign
state.10 1 The present and proposed formulation, however, can be interpreted to grant jurisdiction in a suit between a New Yorker and a
Californian though there are Frenchmen on both sides. Such an exception to Strawbridgewould be appropriate enough, since a New York or
California court's favor for the local litigant seems unlikely to be
affected by the contending French; but this would be equally true if
the cocitizen opponents hailed from Kansas, and I prefer a blanket rule
for simplicity. In any case the statute should specify whether the exception is intended; the initial purpose of the "additional parties" provision
could be less mysteriously conveyed, if Strawbridge is to be preserved,
by granting jurisdiction when one party is a citizen of a state and all
plaintiffs are citizens of different states or foreign states from all defen1 02

dants.

The ALI does propose one new exception to the complete-diversity
rule, although it is rather difficult to recognize:
join in a removal petition under § 1441, Fletcher v. Hamlet, 116 U.S. 408 (1886), and the
statutory prohibition of removal in cases of complete diversity when any defendant is a
resident of the forum state. It makes sense, as Professor Wright says, FEDERAL COURTS 114
(1963), to deny access to a federal court to the resident defendant himself, who has nothing
to fear from his own state court; it makes less sense, for reasons discussed above, to deny
access to his foreign codefendants. Nor is it clear why the willingness of one foreign
defendant to waive removal should deprive others of this protection. Cf. Bradford V.
Harding, 284 F.2d 307, 310 (2d Cir. 1960), rejecting both these limitations when removal
was based on the federal-officer provision in § 1442. Because of the strong policy of protecting the operation of the federal government, a single officer may remove even if other
officers do not join the petition and even if non-officers are also defendants. This should
also be the rule under § 1441.
101 See J. MooRa, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 154 (1949) and cases cited.
102 See note 95 supra. A related problem, though of minor practical impact, is whether
Strawbridge forbids jurisdiction of an otherwise diverse action in which parties on one or
both sides are not citizens of either American or foreign states. If the rule is that common
citizenship on both sides defeats diversity, the case of a noncitizen on one side clearly is
cognizable and the bilateral case debatable. The Strawbridge opinion itself requires that
each person must be "entitled to sue" or be sued in federal court, suggesting that even the
unilateral noncitizen case cannot be heard. Because the presence of noncitizens is not
likely to eliminate bias in either case, the former interpretation accords better with
diversity policy; but the latter has the advantage of having been clearly stated in easily
applicable, across-the-board form in a prominent Supreme Court opinion. If Strawbridge
is codified, it ought to be stated to exclude these cases from jurisdiction for the sake of
simplicity, as in note 95.
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Notwithstanding any other provision of this tide, whenever
an action brought by or on behalf of any person is within the
jurisdiction of the district courts under subsection (a) of this
section, jurisdiction in that action shall also extend to any
claim against the same defendant if such claim (1) is brought
by such person on his own behalf or by or on behalf of any
member of his family living in the same household as such
or occurrence that
person and (2) arises out of the transaction
10 3
is the subject matter of the action.
What the Institute is getting at is pendent jurisdiction over related
claims within a single family. Its principal concern seems to be with
restrictive decisions respecting the jurisdictional amount, and in that
context the proposal raises serious problems of administrability. 10 4 But
the ALI's citation of Borror v. Sharon Steel Co.10 5 suggests the additional possibility of pendent jurisdiction over controversies between
parties not of diverse citizenship. 10 6 In Borror the Third Circuit held
that when a West Virginia administrator sued a Pennsylvania defendant
for wrongful death, a survival claim was properly joined even if it
belonged to the victim's Pennsylvania relatives.
If Strawbridge is to be repudiated, let it be done not this way but
directly and after facing the relevant issues. The Borror case is not
analogous to one in which jurisdiction is based on a federal question,
or in which the pendent claim is diverse but lacks the jurisdictional
amount. Joinder of the pendent claim in the latter situations by no
means impairs the need for a federal court to adjudicate the claims on
which jurisdiction is based; if there is to be a single proceeding to
decide both claims there is good reason to have it in federal court. But
when a dispute between two Pennsylvanians is joined to a dispute over
which there is jurisdiction only because of diversity, the assumption
underlying Strawbridgetells us there is no need for federal jurisdiction
even of the diverse claim. Judicial economy can be served, without substantial risk of bias, by a single suit on both claims in a state court. I
cannot agree that family cases are so special that Strawbridge should be
relaxed for them alone, especially when such ambiguous criteria define
the exception.
pt. I, at 9-10, § 1301(e).
104 See Part II of this article, text at notes 395-8.
103 OFFiCAL DRAFT,

I, at 65 n.10.
106 It may be that the limitation to persons "living in the same household" eliminates
this possibility. But is it clear that this limitation refers to domicile in the sense that
determines citizenship for diversity purposes? Grandma may still vote in Tennessee though
she has been staying with the folks in Illinois for forty years; and Junior in Leavenworth
105 327 F.2d 165 (3d Cir. 1964), cited in OFFCIAL DRAFr, pt.

may still be a citizen of Illinois although he hasn't spent a night in the house since his
conviction.
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b. Separate-Claim Removal. Section 1441(c), which authorizes re.
moval of state-court actions containing "separate and independent"
claims, is one of the most unfortunate provisions in the entire Judicial
Code, Even its most general contours are not widely understood, and
nobody knows exactly what it means. Its effect is odd on its face: The
section creates an exception to the complete-diversity rule that can be
invoked only by defendants, and it allows an entire case to be removed
because its parts are independent. Its purposes are obscure; amendments
of the original provision have left it a patchwork that poorly serves any
discernible policy. The ALI wants to keep it-to amend it again, but
to keep it.
There would be no need for separate-claim removal if there were no
Strawbridge v. Curtiss; any lawsuit with minimal diversity would be
removable under section 1441(a) since the whole suit would be originally cognizable in federal court. 0 7 Strawbridge, destroying original
federal jurisdiction, closed this avenue of removal; but the philosophy
of that decision tells us that there is no danger of bias, and thus no need
for removal, because diversity is incomplete. The statute thus makes
little sense if Strawbridge is right or if Strawbridge is wrong.
The development of the statute suggests that its present form is a
m~salliance of three distinct principles: a mistrust of the completediversity rule in certain cases; a desire to eliminate the plaintiff's forumshopping advantage; and a policy against multiple trials involving a
single transaction. We begin with Moore's insight that the section was
designed to "protect a nonresident defendant, who had been joined
with one or more local defendants under the relaxed and expanding
state joinder provisions."' 0 8 Why, if Strawbridge was right (and Congress did not overrule the decision), did such a defendant need protection? Perhaps because, as the ALI commentary recognizes, the presence
of a local defendant is no safeguard when interests are not joint. 0 9 The
Supreme Court's interpretation of the original provision conforms
rather well with this thesis: Claims against concurrent tort-feasors (one
of whom could be found solely at fault) were held "separable" and thus
removable, while claims against an employer for acts of his employees
(where liability depended on employee fault) were not."20
107 A possible problem with this position is discussed in note 120 infra.

108 J. MooRE, COMMVENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 239 (1949).
109 OFFICIAL DRAT, pt, I, at 87.
11o Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534 (1939), constrming Act of July 27, 1866, ch.
28, 14 Stat. 306. To be sure, a foreign employee would not be protected by the joinder
of his local employer, for the state court might find his act outside the scope of employment. Moreover, the common suspicion that the employer will pay doubtless makes joinder
of a local employee little real protection for the foreign master.
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But an out-of-state plaintiff is no more protected by the presence of
a local co-party without a joint interest than is a defendant; if Strawbridge was too broad, why did Congress limit the exception to defendants? The answer may be that the foreign plaintiff has the option of
protecting himself by suing alone, in the federal court; the 1866 removal
provision merely canceled out his advantage by allowing the foreign
defendant the same opportunity to take the diverse part of the case into
federal court. Indeed this policy of equal treatment might support such
a removal provision even if Congress did not think Strawbridge too
broad: Both parties should have the same power to determine the
forum. But this would mean the Supreme Court's interpretation was
too restrictive: To equalize the plaintiff's choice, removal should have
been allowed whenever the nondiverse parties were not indispensable.
As construed, then, the original "separable controversy" removal
statute seems best explained as based upon the desire to give defendants
the same escape from an overbroad complete-diversity requirement that
plaintiffs already enjoyed because of their ability to leave nondiverse
parties out of the lawsuit. But an 1875 amendment,'1 1 preserved in the
1948 revision and by the ALI proposal, injected a third policy consideration that threw the whole statute out of equilibrium.
The amendment, as interpreted, provided simply that upon removal
of the separable diverse controversy the nondiverse components of the
state-court suit were to be removed as well. The Supreme Court made
clear why: Its construction of the statute, in accord with apparent congressional distrust of Strawbridge, allowed removal in many cases (e.g.,
concurrent tort-feasors) in which the diverse and nondiverse controversies arose out of the same transaction. Removal of the entire case was
necessary in such cases to avoid two trials and consequent duplication
of proof. 112 But with this amendment the statute ceased to make sense,
for it gave the defendant alone, unjustifiably, the opportunity to litigate
in federal court without splitting one lawsuit into two. If local parties
with several interests did not destroy the need for a federal forum, and
if judicial economy demanded a consolidated proceeding, Strawbridge
should have been relaxed for plaintiffs as well as for defendants.
Thus, after 1875, a statute designed to eliminate an unfair advantage
of plaintiffs gave an equally unfair advantage to defendants. But the
1948 revision made matters ever so much worse. The Revisers found too
much removal and too much litigation over separability; to reduce
both ' 3 they substituted the present term "separate and independent
111 Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470.
112 Barney v. Lathant, 103 U.S. 205, 212-3 (1881).
113 See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1964), Reviser's Note.
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claim or cause of action," perpetuating the confusion while losing sight
altogether of the relevant policies. In accord with the Revisers' expressed intention, section 1441(c) has been authoritatively construed to
forbid removal when two defendants are charged with alternative or
joint and several liability for a single loss;" 14 the out-of-state concurrent
tort-feasor for whose protection the statute was enacted has been removed
from its scope.115 Moreover, the broad discretion to take jurisdiction of
nondiverse claims upon removal sits very poorly with the new test of
removability. For claims now are seldom removable as "separate" unless
they are completely unrelated; in such a situation the judicial-economy
justification for removing the nondiverse parts of the case does not
apply." 6 It is a contradiction in policy as well as in language, on the
present interpretation of section 1441(c), to hold a claim "independent"
and "pendent" at the same time. 117 Thus the present statute manages
to create difficult interpretive problems, fails to accomplish its policy
of protecting against abuses of Strawbridge,invites the federal courts to
take pendent jurisdiction when judicial administration does not call
for it, and grants the defendant an unjustified advantage over the
plaintiff in bringing cases less than wholly diverse into federal court.
The ALI, unfortunately, intends to retain and to broaden the defendant's advantage, by allowing him to remove whenever he "would have
been able to remove" under the general removal provision "if sued
114 American Fire & Cas. Co. v. Finn, 841 U.S. 6 (1951).

115 Some have surmised that the separate-claim statute is of no use whatever: Any claims
sufficiently related to be joined in a state court may be too closely related to permit
removal as "separate." See Note, Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the
Federal Courts, 71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 896 (1958); and see Holloway v. Gamble-Skogro,
Inc., 274 F. Supp. 321, 323 (N.D. Ill. 1967): "Several cases have directly held . . . that
removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) is limited to situations where joinder of claims or parties
has been by plaintiff only." Lower courts, however, have found cases that avoid Scylla as
well as Charybdis [e.g., Climax Chem. Co. v. C.F. Braun & Co. 370 F.2d 616 (10th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 981 (1967) (breach of several contracts for construction of
various components of a single factory); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239
F. Supp. 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (breach of contracts of Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor
relating to single movie)]; and Professor Moore stresses, without suggesting what conceivable policy is served by the distinction, that a suit by two injured accident plaintiffs
against a single defendant contains two "claims" or "causes of action" even if the facts
are largely common. J. MooRE, COMMENTARY ON THE U.S. JUDICIAL CODE 238 (1949).
116 But see the Taylor case cited in note 115 supra, where the court allowed removal
of the whole case; the claims were "separate" but not factually unrelated.
117 The constitutional difficulty with the pendent-jurisdiction provision of § 1441(c)
seems more acute in federal-question than in diversity cases, for there is no constitutional
barrier to repealing the complete-diversity rule. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire,
386 U.S. 523, 530-1 (1967). Yet surely there is some limit to the definition of "controversies"
between citizens of different states in Article III, for otherwise the entire jurisdiction
reserved to the states could be invaded by joining nondiverse suits with unrelated diverse
ones.
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alone by any party making claim against him in the State court
action."'118 This amendment, says the commentary, will eliminate the
difficulty of determining separateness or separability, and will, as the
existing law does not, protect the foreign tort-feasor from prejudice." 9
The broadened test of removability, in addition, will justify on conservation-of-resources grounds the retention of the provision allowing
removal, when appropriate, of the non-federal parts of the suit. But
there are two problems with this proposal. First, it will allow removal
even when there is little possibility of hurting the outsider alone, as in
Strawbridgeitself. This would be acceptable if Strawbridgewere simply
to be repealed; but, more seriously, no reason appears for relegating the
parties to a game of musical chairs in which only the defendant can
have the case litigated in federal court without splitting one lawsuit
into two.
If Strawbridge is not satisfactory when interests are several, the
modern policy against multiple lawsuits demands that the doctrine be
relaxed for plaintiffs as well as for defendants. If Strawbridge is satisfactory, there is no need for separate-claim removal, because joinder
destroys the effect of bias. In neither case is there any excuse for perpetuating this confusing, complicated, and unequal provision, which with
every amendment has increasingly done more harm than good. 2 0
DRArt, pt. I, at 15-16, § 1304(b).
119 Id. at 87.
120 I see no reason to retain § 1441(c) simply to equalize the plaintiff's ability to obtain
118 OFFicIAL

a federal forum by splitting his lawsuit. Splitting lawsuits is not to be encouraged; we
let plaintiffs do it only because of the administrative difficulty of ascertaining, if we made
all proper parties indispensable, whether they have all been joined. And at that, as
discussed in the next section of this paper, we often allow additional parties into the suit
afterwards without asking the plaintiff's consent. In such cases the conflict between
Strawbridge and the policy of judicial economy is striking.
More deserving is the notion that removal should be allowed when the plaintiff, instead
of splitting one lawsuit, combines two unrelated ones to defeat removal. If Strawbridge
is wrong, the general removal statute might still not cover the case because the whole suit
could not have been brought in federal court; the unrelated claim is not part of the
statutory "civil action," whose scope should be defined in terms of the transaction. But if
Strawbridge were overruled, the statute should be read to equate "civil action" in the
removal statute with "civil action" in the diversity section-though the state suit is
broader, whatever could have been brought in federal court is the "action" and therefore
removable. (Before 1948 some lower courts permitted removal under the general provision
despite joinder of an unrelated, unremovable claim, because the "suit" was originally
cognizable in federal court; see Lewin, The Federal Courts' Hospitable Back Door-Removal of "Separate and Independent" Non-Federal Causes of Action, 66 HARv. L. REV.

423, 426 (1953), arguing implausibly that the 1948 substitution of "civil action" for "suit"
may have made this no longer possible.) If Strawbridge is retained, too, I would simply
repeal § 1441(c); the chance that state courts would allow joinder of wholly unrelated
claims involving different parties seems too remote, and the harm done to defendants,
if it occurred, too small on the Strawbridge assumption, to justify attempting once more
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c. Interpleaderand Dispersed Parties. Confronted by two claimants
to a single insurance fund, the New York Life Insurance Company paid
the money into a Pennsylvania state coUrt and left the claimants to fight
over it, only to discover that it had to pay twice; for the Supreme Court
held in 1916 that state courts in interpleader could not cut off the claims
of absent persons who were beyond the reach of ordinary process.' 2 '
Congress responded with the Intdrpleader Act, which authorizes nationWide federal-court service when a fund is sought by "two or more
adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship as defined in section 1332."122
In 1939 the Court held the stakeholder need not, under this statute, be
diverse to all the claimants; the statute required "diversity only between
claimants," and it was constitutional because "there is a real controVersy between the adverse claimants."' 23 In 1967, in State Farm Fire &
Cas. Co. v. Tashire,'24 the Court approved a block of lower-court decisions holding that in interpleader complete diversity among rival claimants was required neither by the statute nor by the Constitution,
The Interpleader Act is a well-designed response to the inadequacy
of state tribunals, entirely within the purpose of the diversity jurisdiction. The Tashire holding that minimal diversity suffices is necessary
to fill the gap left by limitations on state personal jurisdiction; and this
fact is enough, coupled with the flexible language of Article III, to
to make the necessary painful distinctions. If repeal of § 1441(c) is not possible, the
statute should allow removal only when the diverse claim arises out of a different transaction than the rest of the suit, and it should specify that the nondiverse, unrelated claims
ate to be left behind.
121 New York Life In. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
122 28 U,S.C. §§ 1335, 2361 (1964).
123 Treihies V. Sunshine Min.Co., 308 U.S. 66, 71, 72 (1939). Lower courts have continued,
after Treinies, to entertain under the general diversity provision of § 1352 interpleaders
in which the stakeholder is a citizen Of one state and all claimants citizens of a second. E.g.,
John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kraft, 200 F.2d 952, 953 (2d Cir. 1953). If the Court
in Trenies nieafit that the only controversy was between the claimants (even if Strawbridge
is constitutionally iequired, said the Court, the stakeholder's deposit and discharge
"dem6nstratds the applicant's disinterestedness as between the claimants and as to the
property in dispute," 308 U.S. at 72), there is no jurisdiction in these cases. Moreover, since
the stakeholder could usually sue the several claimants in the courts of the state where
thdy all reside, the jitstification for federal jurisdiction is less pressing than when the
elaiinatts are diverse from eah other. At the beginning of the lawsuit, however, when
jurisdiction is generally determined, the stakeholder plainly has a controversy with each
claimant, aS the Dunlevy case graphically illustrates. Also, the stakeholder's opportunity
to interpleafd in a state court counts for little if he is already being sued by one of the
claimants in a federal court; the risk of double liability then justifies either ancillary
jurisdiction over the other claimantS regardless of their citizenship, or dismissal for
inability to join indispensable parties, see Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 868 U.S.
71 (1961). Tseinies can and should be read to say Strawbridge is satisfied because the
Controvetsy among the claimants is divexse; there is ancillary jurisdiction over the stakeholder's contr6versies.
124 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
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sustain the constitutionality of the jurisdiction. There remains the nagging question why, since federal courts can issue nationwide process in
interpleader cases, state courts cannot; recent decisions suggest, rightly,
that the desirability of avoiding either multiple liability or a windfall
to the stakeholder today justifies extraterritorial state service according
to the Supreme Court's due-process calculus of fundamental fairness in
the light of state interests, contacts, and total convenience. 125 But federal jurisdiction remains justified until the Court has clearly upheld
state authority and the states have legislated to protect the stakeholder.
The ALI proposes to retain interpleader jurisdiction, making clear
in the statute that minimal diversity will suffice, that citizens of foreign
states, of the District of Columbia, and of other Tidewater jurisdictions
are included, and that the stakeholder is not barred by being independently liable to one or more of the claimaints; allowing process, sensibly,
anywhere outside the country "that process of the United States may
reach" and providing for change of venue; 126 and, most importantly,
authorizing the district courts to ignore state laws respecting choice of
law. 127
The problem of choosing among the laws of several states in diversity
cases is one of the knottiest around. Its consideration involves the purposes of the diversity jurisdiction and of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, the policies underlying Erie R.R. v. Tompkins,128 and the
unsettled principles of the conflict of laws. At the outset, in support of
the ALI's proposal, it should be noted that the reasons given by the
Supreme Court for deferring to state choice-of-law doctrines have no
application to interpleader cases. The purpose and effect of the Klaxon
and Barrack decisions were to assure that diversity cases would be
decided as if they had been brought in state court; the "accident" of
diversity was intended to supply an unbiased forum but not a change
of law.1 29 Because federal districts closely respect state lines, it is fair
to assume actions brought in Texas federal court would have been
brought in Texas if there were no federal courts, But the very basis of
federal interpleader is that the case as a whole could not have been
brought in any state court; the forum-shopping, outcome-determinative
reasoning of Klaxon and Barrack, uncritically extended to interpleader
in Griffin v. McCoach,230 is inapplicable.
125 See especially Atkinson v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 338, 316 P.2d 960 (1957).
126 See Part II of this article, text at notes 407-66.
127 OFFicL DaArr, pt. I, at 44-46, 160-2, §§ 1335,

2361.
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
129 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 318 U.S. 487 (1941); Van Dusen v. Barrack,
376 U.S. 612 (1964).
130 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
128
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It remains to inquire whether there are reasons other than those
given by the Court for following state choice-of-law doctrines in interpleader. The general policies behind Erie suggest that state conflicts
rules should not be followed: Maximum respect for state interests131
would be achieved by an independent federal examination of competing policies; and, because state courts are not open, it is only by
following local choice-of-law rules that there can be any disuniformity
of outcome or any forum-shopping in interpleader cases. 132 Any broadening of the policies thought to underlie diversity jurisdiction or the
Full Faith Clause would similarly militate against following state
choice-of-law principles: If one purpose of either clause is to resolve
interstate conflicts as a federal matter, problems of forum-shopping,
uniformity, and respect for state interests disappear even in ordinary
diversity cases; even state courts would follow federal choice-of-law
doctrine.133
In ordinary diversity cases, until choice of law is recognized to be a
federal question, the undesirability of intrastate forum-shopping argues
for retention of Klaxon despite the evils of disuniformity among federal
courts and the contention that a federal choice would best effectuate
Erie's command of deference to state concerns. In interpleader, where
there is no intrastate forum-shopping, everything so far considered
points toward abolishing Klaxon. Modern choice-of-law analysis, however, suggests difficulties with this approach and a possible argument for
retaining at least some degree of deference to state conflicts doctrine
even in interpleader.
Current conflicts analysis teaches that choice-of-law "rules" miss the
whole point: The applicability of a state rule of absolute liability, for
example, to a case with foreign elements is a question of construction
of that state's law in light of its policy and of the contacts of the case
with each state. Thus, in interpleader cases and elsewhere too, the
diversity court's first task under Erie ought to be not reference to the
conflicts law of the possibly disinterested state where it sits, but determination, as a matter of each state's substantive law, of which laws
apply. Trouble begins if the laws of two or more states are found
applicable, but many problem cases can be resolved by ruling that one
131 See Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 856 U.S. 525 (1958); Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U.S. 460, 474-5 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
132 The argument over the relative demerits of intrastate and interstate forumshopping, see D. Ckvpms, THE CHOIcE-oF-LAw PRocEss 222 (1965), is thus not relevant to
interpIeader.
133 See Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. 1, 22-42 (1963);
Horowitz, Toward a Federal Common Law of Choice of Law, 14 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 1191
(1967).
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state would not wish to push its policy so far in the face of the other's
interest or the parties' expectations. 134 If balancing the competing interests proves not feasible, Klaxon may be the most satisfactory residual
solution; the ALI's proposal allows for this dubious possibility 35 by
merely permitting rather than requiring departure from state rules. I
therefore endorse the ALI's proposals respecting interpleader, although
because of the present incompleteness of methods of resolving true conflicts, I would not generally overrule Klaxon but would leave the matter
to be developed by the Supreme Court.
Having corralled a good thing in interpleader, the ALI proceeds to
beat it to death by proposing an entirely new set of provisions for
jurisdiction of controversies, minimally diverse, that are beyond the
power of a single state court to determine fully and fairly. The policy is
unexceptionable: If the state courts cannot do full justice because interested people are beyond state reach, open the federal courts. But the
proposal takes eleven tedious pages to spell out as a statute; 136 not one
example is given of a case requiring this treatment; and the complicated
provisions promise reams of interpretive litigation.
The basic provision would confer jurisdiction of "any civil action in
which the several defendants who are necessary for a just adjudication
of the plaintiff's claim are not all amenable to process of any one territorial jurisdiction, and one of any two adverse parties is a citizen of a
State and the other is a citizen or subject of another territorial jurisdiction." 37 Two difficulties are immediately apparent: Who is a "necessary" party, and how is the court to determine whether a party is
"amenable to process"?
One of the beauties of interpleader is that the statute ignores these
imponderables; if there are scattered claimants, there is a substantial
likelihood they cannot be gathered into any state court, and that is
enough for federal jurisdiction. The Institute, aware of the problem of
threshold litigation in dispersed-party cases, establishes a set of objective
tests to avoid "detailed inquiry as to physical presence of a party within
a given jurisdiction at a particular time": A person is "amenable to
process" in a state if and only if he is domiciled, resident, or incorporated there, if the state is his principal place of business or he has an
134 See B. Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 754, 757-8

(1963).
135 See D. Currie, The Choice Among State Laws in Maritime Death Cases, 21 VAND. L.
REv. 297 (1968), for detailed discussion of a related problem, concluding optimistically that
most conflicts can probably be rationally resolved by federal courts.
136 OFFicIAL DRArr, pt. I, at 33-43, §§ 2341-6. Brief explanatory notes are included. The
commentary consumes id., 120-59.
137 Id. at 33, § 2341.
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agent there to receive process, or if he is subject to long-arm service of
process. 38 This enumeration is better than nothing, but it will scarcely
be easy to administer. The principal place of business has caused great
difficulties under the multiple-citizenship provision now in section
1332(c); 1 9 in addition to domicile, which may have to be determined
for additional parties beyond the two necessary for diversity under the
proposal, the courts are directed to investigate a new concept of "established residence"; and, not least, jurisdiction will often depend upon
construction of the long-arm statutes of more than one state.
The proposed test of a necessary party is no more encouraging: "A
defendant is necessary for a just adjudication of the plaintiff's claim
• . . if complete relief cannot be accorded the plaintiff in his absence,

or if it appears that, under federal law or relevant State law, an action
on the claim would have to be dismissed if he could not be joined as
a party."1 40 This double definition is designed to reach two kinds of
cases: those in which a truly necessary party cannot be reached by state
process, and those in which an erroneous state view of indispensability
renders the state court in fact unavailable. A case can be made for federal jurisdiction in both situations, but determining when they are
presented is no mean task. The second clause demands, again, an investigation of several bodies of law, this time probably very murky. And
the Institute concedes the obscurity of its first clause: Even the "indispensable" party "has not been defined with any measure of clarity," and
the "necessary" party is still more poorly defined, because of the "inherent 4ifficulties" of demarcating "a line on what is essentially a continuous spectrum of urgency of joinder" and because "in its procedural
setting, the concept of 'necessary' parties is not one on which ultimate
holdings rest" and therefore is seldom litigated. Consequently, "a
judicial sharpening of the concept beyond what has previously been
achieved" will be required: yet "there seems no better formulation to
express the degree of urgency for assembling multiple parties. .... -141
No better formulation, that is, except to abandon the game because of
the cost of the candle.
The ALI proceeds to prescribe venue for dispersed-party actions
(where "a substantial part" of the events occurred or "a substantial
part" of the property is situated, or where "any party resides" if there
Id. at 33-34, 138, § 2341(c).
See text at nqtes 167-74 infra.
140 OFFICIAL Da r, pt. I, at 33, § 2141(b).
141 Id. at 135-6. The proposed statute makes clear that the ordinary concurrent tortfeasor is not a necessary party. Id. at 33, 136-7. Additional definitions in § 2345, id. at 41-42,
would, among other things, treat a corporation chartered by two states as diverse to
citizens of both.
138
139
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is no such district, with the residence of corporations and associations
specially defined);14 2 to authorize injunctions against related actions in
state or federal courts, nationwide process (and service anywhere else
"that process of the United States may reach"), and transfer (to "any
other district," on anyone's motion, "for the convenience of parties and
witnesses or otherwise in the interest of justice"); and to allow the
district court to make its own choice among state laws. 143 These provisions are straightforward enough, except for the uncertainty of determining what "part" of events or property is "substantial" and for the
burdensome inquiry into "convenience" and "justice" in deciding upon
transfer.
Two additional provisions add complexity: If there are parties
beyond even the extended process authorized, the court is directed to
proceed without them "unless it is satisfied that greater injustice would
be caused by proceeding without them than by total failure of the
action." Finally, if no more than $5,000 is at stake for any party, and if
jurisdiction "would lead to undue burden on distant parties," the court
may dismiss them without prejudice and proceed without them or, if
convinced that "greater injustice would be caused by any continuation
of the proceedings than by total failure of the action," dismiss the
whole suit. 1 44 No standards are provided; both provisions essentially ask
the court to do what is right. Extensive proof respecting relative injury
is to be expected, and the word "discretion" may not suffice, even in the
one section in which it is used, to ward off time-consuming and
expensive appeals.
If this were all, it would be grotesque enough. But there is more:
separate provisions for removal of actions brought in state courts and
for bringing in additional parties in federal actions commenced under
other jurisdictional provisions. 14 5 Both these sections focus upon parties
"necessary for a just adjudication as to a defendant"; if such a party
cannot be joined or served in state court the case may be removed, and
the requirements of personal jurisdiction and complete diversity are
relaxed in suits already in federal court. The definition of a "necessary"
party for these two sections differs from that discussed above: A person
is necessary "if he claims or may claim an interest relating to the property or transactions which is the subject of the action and is so situated
that the disposition of the action in his absence may leave the defendant
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
142 Id. at
143 Id. at
144 Id. at
145 Id. at

34-35, § 2342.
38-39, § 2344.
39-40, §§ 2344(d), (e).
35-37, 42-43, §§ 2343, 2346.
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inconsistent obligations." But for the obscure and unexplained reference to an interest in the "transaction," this looks remarkably like an
interpleader situation; it seems covered by the ability of such a defendant to file interpleader in the federal court and to enjoin the action
against him.146
Thus the entire proposal for dispersed-party jurisdiction to protect
defendants may be unnecessary. Moreover, in these cases the Institute
dispenses with its objective standards for ascertaining amenability to
state service without extended litigation: "Since there is only one jurisdiction involved, and one in which there would normally be an attempt
to reach absent necessary parties, it is appropriate that when federal
jurisdiction is based upon the unamenability of the absentee to state
process it should turn upon whether the necessary party could with
reasonable diligence have been subjected to the jurisdiction of the state
court."'147 Additional complexity is created by provision for stay of the
federal proceeding, after removal, if there is another state court in
which all parties could be joined; 48 and by the complicated treatment
49
of counterclaims.
I would not inflict this monster of threshold litigation upon the federal courts without the strongest showing of urgent need. The ALI has
not given one instance in which such jurisdiction is needed. The
dispersed-party proposals should be disapproved. 15 0
d. PartiesAdded After the Complaint. Except for the limited proposal just discussed respecting "necessary" parties the ALI does not deal
with the issues, so often presented, of pendent or ancillary jurisdiction
over intervenors, third-party defendants, and others brought into the
case after suit is begun. These issues present in sharp detail the critical
collision, overlooked by the Institute, between the complete-diversity
policy of Strawbridge v. Curtiss and the liberal joinder philosophy of
the Civil Rules. Once suit is filed in federal court, judicial economy
suggests that all claims arising from the transaction in suit be cleared
146 28 U.S.C. §§ 1335, 2361 (1964).
147 Orricua DRAFT, pt. I, at 141.
148 Id. at 37, § 2343(e).
149 Id. at 36, 42, §§ 2343(c), 2346(b). If a counterclaim arises out of the same transaction
as the plaintiff's claim, the plaintiff shall be considered a defendant, and the defendant a
plaintiff, for purposes of determining whether absent persons are necessary, and for all
other purposes both parties may be deemed defendants. If the counterclaim is unrelated,
the plaintiff may remove if as defendant he could have removed an independent action
on the counterclaim. In a federal action based on diversity the usual venue, process, and
complete-diversity requirements are relaxed for necessary additional parties when the
counterclaim is compulsory.
150 To abolish Strawbridge, of course, would eliminate the problem, except as to venue
and personal jurisdiction, considered in Part II of this article, text at notes 407-46.
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up at the same time; but Strawbridge forbids the plaintiff to name all
the parties concerned unless they are completely diverse.
The lower courts, rather uniformly, have tended to resolve this
problem in favor of judicial economy at the expense of Strawbridge.
Defendants may implead third parties liable to themselves whether they
be cocitizens of the plaintiff or of the defendant,1 51 and persons entitled
to intervene as of right may do so without regard to diversity.152 Where
Strawbridge has been most flagrantly threatened with subversion, the
courts have balked: Indispensable parties cannot intervene unless
diverse to their adversaries, since there is no legitimate action to which
they can be appended; 153 a defendant under a since-repealed provision
could not implead a party liable only to a nondiverse plaintiff; 54 and
some courts say a plaintiff cannot make a claim against a nondiverse
third party brought in to answer to the defendant. 55
Except in the case of the indispensable party, permission to make
claims against nondiverse persons is necessary to keep Strawbridge from
destroying the ability of the federal courts to handle entire controversies.
Unfortunately, reliance on the Civil Rules to justify relaxing Strawbridge encounters difficulty with Rule 82's command that the Rules
not affect jurisdiction; in order to avoid this probem, as well as to overturn the unjustifiable exceptions discussed above, the statute ought to
make dear that additional, not indispensable, parties may be added, or
cross-claims made among existing parties, without regard to diversity
of citizenship or to amount. 5 6
The present law, permitting impleader and intervention to create
a federal action that could not have been brought originally in federal
court, has a musical-chairs aspect that is hard to defend. The best
justification is that the plaintiff is always free to combine all related
claims in a state court; once he has filed a limited, wholly diverse claim
in federal court, however, dismissal of the entire controversy may be a
harsh and wasteful act when nondiverse claims are appended, so that
151 See, e.g., Huggins v. Graves, 337 F.2d 486, 488-9 (6th Cir. 1964).
152 See Note, Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts,
71 HARv. L. REv. 874, 905-6 (1958), and cases cited. Decisions allowing compulsory counter-

claims to be made without regard to amount are analogous but easier, since the Strawbridge argument that the entire controversy belongs in state court cannot be made. See
note 391 in Part II of this article.
153 See Note, Developments in the Law-Multiparty Litigation in the Federal Courts,

71 HaRv. L. REv. 874, 905 (1958).
154 Friend v. Middle Ad. Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1946).
155 E.g., Huggins v. Graves, 337 F.2d 486, 488-9 (6th Cir. 1964) (dictum).
156 The serious question whether venue and process should also be relaxed in the
interest of enabling related claims to be combined is considered in Part II of this article,
text at notes 444-6.
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consolidation can reasonably be obtained only in a federal court. But
this inducement of the plaintiff tb split one lawsuit into two in order to
obtain a federal trial; coupled with a relaxation of Strawbridge when
additional parties are sought to be brought in, furnishes still another
argument against the complete-diversity rule itself.
I conclude that Strawbridge is simply wrong and should be overruled
by statute. It is Strawbridge that gives rise to pleas for such academic
horrors as the dispersed-party jurisdiction; that induces a plaintiff to
leave off parties Who ought to be joined, only to see them added after
the complaint; that causes trouble with Rule 82 on grounds that the
Rules illegally expand jurisdiction; that unnecessarily splits up claims
arising from a single transaction; that makes necessary the cumbersome
and litigation-provoking separate-claim removal. These costs, I think,
are too high to pay for the dubious principle, so clearly subject to exceptions and yet so difficult to limit effectively, that the presence of
adverse cocitizens is assurance against prejudice. If diversity is retained,
Strawbridge ought not to be. 15T
4. Corporationsand Other Associations
a. Determining Citizenship. After first indignantly protesting that
"that invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity,
a corporation aggregate, is certainly not a citizen,"' 58 the Supreme Court
in the middle of the nineteenth century decided that a corporation
could be "deemed" a citizen of its state of incorporation, 59 or, as it
said in a later case, its shareholders could be conclusively "presumed"
citizens of that state, for diversity purposes. 160 Why? Because, in the
first place, a corporation has the same power as breathing citizens to
contract, to commit torts, to sue, and to be sued; and because, in the
second place, a corporation can be the victim or the beneficiary of
prejudice against foreigners just as if it were a human being.161 Here,
apparently, the Strawbridge assumption was not thought to operate:
The presence of a shareholder from the same state as the opposing
157 To do away with Strawbridge would also eliminate the unseemly spectacle, in class
actions and in derivative suits, of seeking out a diverse plaintiff among large numbers of
interested parties. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921); Smith v.
Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957). In Hood v. James, 256 F.2d 895, 903 (5th Cir. 1958), this tactic
failed. The difficulty of inv~estigating the propriety 6f choosing the diverse representative
is another unsavory byproduct of Strawbridge.
158 Baik of the United States v. Deveatix, 9 U.S. (5 Crahch) 61, 86 (1809). This holding
did not mean corporate litigation was always outside the diversity jurisdiction, as it might
have; the Court treated the case as if the shareholders were parties and allowed suit
because they were all alleged to be diverse from the opposing party, id. at 62, 91-92.
159 Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844).
160 Marshall v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314, 328 (1854).
161 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 558; 57 U.S. (16 How.) at 329.
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party was not enough to remove the danger of bias. This is sensible
enough, whatever one may think of Strawbridge; for the court and the
jury are likely to be unaware of the residence of all the shareholders,
and it would be unfortunate and cumbersome to require proof of their
citizenship in order to determine jurisdiction.
But in the 1880's the Court developed a myopia about these matters.
Confronted with a suit between a New York joint stock association and
a citizen of another state, the Court refused jurisdiction because a joint
stock company "is not a corporation."1 6 2 Why that mattered the Court
did not say; the statute still did not mention corporations, and a much
later Second Circuit decision showed that the tests applied by the
Court in the early decisions deeming corporations citizens were equally
applicable to the association. 163 Joint-stock companies have the same
power as corporations to contract, to commit torts, to sue and to be
sued under New York law; the possibility of prejudice for or against
such a company seems identical; the only difference the Second Circuit
could see was a remote and contingent shareholder liability that it
found indistinguishable from the liability of shareholders in banking
corporations under many laws.
Yet when a similar problem concerning the status of a labor union
came to the Supreme Court not long ago in United Steelworkers v. R.
H. Bouligny, Inc.,164 the Court refused jurisdiction on the ground that
the problem was one for the legislature to resolve. The union is a harder
case to deal with than the corporation, because of its complicated structure of locals and internationals and because of the absence of a clear
state of registration; but the language of the opinion suggests that the
Court would adhere to the ruling against jurisdiction in the case of the
limited partnership or joint stock company, although these do not
present the problems of the union.
In view of the Court's initial willingness to find a niche for corporations in the diversity statute this deference to Congress is remarkable.
The application of statutes to situations not anticipated by the legislature is a pre-eminently judicial function, and the Court's refusal to
decide constituted a decision against jurisdiction without considering
the relevant arguments. Bouligny cannot be justified by the 1958 amendment expressly recognizing corporate citizenship, for this was plainly
directed to the separate issue of eliminating abuses of the presumption
of shareholder citizenship; the amendment can easily be held to leave
162 Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889). Accord, Great Southern Fireproof
Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900) (limited partnership).
163 Mason v. American Express Co., 334 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1964).
164 382 U.S. 145 (1965).
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unimpaired the Court's power to construe "citizen" according to statutory purpose, or even to express concurrence with the Court's original
view that associations having the characteristics of citizens should be
treated as such. Congressional design might be violated if an association
were given greater access to federal court than that allowed a corporation under the restrictive amendment, but I see no obstacle to construing "corporation" in section 1332(c) to include the joint-stock
association and the limited partnership, which are identical with
corporations in terms of diversity policy.
The Institute proposes to make any unincorporated association a
citizen of its state of principal business, if it has capacity to sue or be
sued in the forum state. 165 The reference to forum-state law may be
troublesome, 1 6 but the main difficulty I have with the ALI suggestion
relates to the criterion of principal place of business. This problem is
the central, still unresolved problem of diversity and associations of
all kinds; the inability of anyone to resolve it successfully is a powerful
point against the diversity jurisdiction itself.
When a corporation or association is wholly connected with a single
state, there is every reason to equate it with the ordinary citizen for
diversity purposes. Just as with individuals, however, and to a much
greater extent because far-flung corporations are so common, the quest
to isolate bias-producing factors becomes chimerical when the corporation is not localized. It is clear enough, for example, that a New York
corporation set up by New York shareholders to run a New York store
staffed by New Yorkers will be regarded as a foreigner if it litigates in
Georgia; it is less clear how the corporation would be regarded if a
single factor were altered-if the company had a Georgia charter, or
one shareholder lived in Georgia, or it had a Georgia store, or its
principal or sole office were in Georgia. Whether shareholders, managers, or place of operations most affects prejudice is not known; and
the problem is quite insoluble when business is done in several states.
The most obvious hallmark of corporation citizenship, and the one
selected by the Supreme Court, is the state of incorporation. This, of
course, is almost wholly arbitrary in terms of diversity policy: New
Yorkers doing New York business are not likely to be viewed as out166 OricuAL DRAFrT, pt. I, at 8, § 1301(b)(2).
166 Capacity of an association to sue or be sued is determined by forum-state law under
FED. R. Civ. P. 17(b), presumably because of Erie considerations. But the relevance of any
state's law to the probable bias that should underlie the definition of citizenship is unclear.
If the concern is with whether an organization has attributes of personality that may
deflect the attention of prejudiced people from the individuals comprising the association,
I should think a reference to the law creating the association would be more appropriate.
And the unexplained reference to ability to sue in the forum state suggests the possible
employment of renvoi, a complicated and uncertain process.
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siders by New York courts just because they have incorporated, as they
so commonly do, in Delaware. To avoid the imposition of purely local
cases on the federal courts, Congress enacted in 1958 that a corporation
should be deemed a citizen of the state of its principal business as well
167
as its state or states of incorporation.
For the pseudo-foreign corporation-the local business incorporated
in another state-this provision is fine, and the ALI is right to propose
extending it to alien corporations with their principal business in an
American state.168 It is also appropriate to hold the pseudo-foreign
corporation a citizen of its charter state, since a state like Delaware that
goes out of its way to attract foreign incorporation fees might well be
expected to treat its proteges favorably in order to keep them happily
registered. 69 Unhappily, neither the present statute nor the ALI proposal is limited to pseudo-foreign corporations; the existing law, which
the Institute accepts in this respect, has uniformly been read to require
the courts to find a single principal place of business for every corporation. In the case of widespread giants like Sears, Roebuck or United
States Steel the task has proved worthy of Procrustes and unworthy of
the federal courts.
Some courts discuss the "nerve center" of the corporation, the place
where management is carried on;' 70 others find the operations of the
business, the manufacturing or selling, more significant. 71' If a test
emerges from the decisions, it seems to be that the place of manufacture
or comparable activity is determinative if it is substantially localized;
if operations are diffused through several states, the courts tend to pick
the place where the high offices are located. 7 2 I suppose this is about
the best that can be done with such a provision.' But I cannot approve
167 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964). See S. REP. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
168 OrricL. DRArr, pt. I, at 8, 57-58, § 1301(b)(1). The present provision has been read
not to make alien corporations citizens of their principal places of business, Eisenberg V.

Commercial Union Assr. Co., 189 F. Supp. 500, 502 (S.D.N.Y. 1960), although the court
did not accept the implication of its holding by excluding the alien corporation from
citizenship altogether.

169 It is odd that the ALI does not make the unincorporated joint stock association or
limited partnership a citizen of its state of registration as well as of principal business.
Whatever considerations justify dual citizenship for corporations in like circumstances

apply equally to them.
170 E.g., Sabo v. Standard Oil Co., 295 F.2d 898, 895 (7th Cir. 1961); Scot Typewriter
Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
171 E.g., Anniston Soil Pipe Co. v. Central Foundry Co., 216 F. Supp. 473, 475-6 (N.D.
Ala. 1968), aff'd, 829 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1964); Inland Rubber Corp. v. Triple A Tire
Serv., Inc., 220 F. Supp. 490, 496 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
172 See 1 J. MooRa, FEDERAL PRACTICE 717.77-.78 (2d ed. 1964); Bruner v. Marjec, Inc.,
250 F. Supp. 426, 427 (V.D. Va. 1966).

173 But see Kelly v. United States Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960), rejecting
both nerve-center and operations tests in favor of the state containing the "headquarters
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the action of the ALI in leaving the section untouched. In the first
place the test is complicated; it requires much threshold litigation on
the question of jurisdiction. 7 4 Second, the result of the inquiry leaves
something to be desired. Not only can there be inconsistent holdings by
various courts, since they are given no statutory guidance, but I have
little confidence that in U.S. Steel's case, for example, the chance of
bias is substantially different in Pennsylvania than in New York. The
entire inquiry seems highly fictitious, and it ought to be abandonednot extended, as the ALI would provide, to cover unincorporated associations too.
Finding a suitable replacement for the present test is, as always, a
harder question. If Strawbridge were overruled, as I have advocated,
one could argue for a return to the test of shareholder citizenship: If
any shareholder is diverse to an opposing party, there is jurisdiction.
Such a rule, however would create a substantial risk of fraudulent
transfers that could not confidently be dealt with, even at the cost of
considerable litigation, by prohibitions of improper assignments; and
it would sweep into federal courts a great stream of corporate litigation
that probably contains no significant danger of local prejudice, because
the unknown shareholder even if one disagrees with Strawbridge,is not
likely to be the cause of xenophobic favoritism. The place of incorporattion is often quite arbitrary; the principal place of business is a litigation-provoking myth; to exclude the corporation from diversity protection wherever it does business would also promote threshold litigation
(recall the troubles of interpreting the old "doing-business" test of personal jurisdiction) and would expose the foreign entrepreneur to
dangers of bias as real as any that exist in diversity cases: A newsstand
in Birmingham would not make Alabamians view the New York
Times as a local enterprise. Still more clearly, to hold corporations
never citizens, or to insist on complete diversity with all shareholders,
would exclude from the jurisdiction many cases in which the corporation or its opponent is in the mainstream of diversity's protective policy.
of day-to-day corporate activity and management ..

" See also Moore & Weckstein,

Corporations and Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction:A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited,

77 HAiv. L. REv. 1426, 1441-5 (1964), arguing for a distinction according to the nature of
the business in order to discover "the state on which the corporation most impinges." For
example. "a mining or manufacturing company would probably have its greatest contact
with the public at the site of its largest operating facility, where most of its employees
and equipment are located; a corporation whose primity business is selling would have
its greatest contact with the public in the state in which most sales are made." Such a
standard increases complexity and still fails to provide a tolerable basis for decision in
cases in which the company has nearly equal selling or operating contacts in several states.
174 By 1968 the ansiotations on principal place of business in § 1332(c) already exceeded
nine pages in U.S.C.A.

1968]

Federal Jurisdiction

The impossibility of defining corporate citizenship is one more
reason why the whole diversity jurisdiction should be repealed. Short
of this unlikely eventuality, I would provide specially for corporations
and similar associations, whatever is done with Strawbridge, because
the organization itself is likely to be a factor diminishing the impact of
the individual member upon state-court prejudice. The best answer I
can suggest is to make a corporation or similar organization a citizen of
any state in which it is chartered, and also of that state in which it
conducts substantially all its activities. 175 This brings me full circle to
an endorsement of the Supreme Court's decision that a labor union is
not a citizen: Since a union has no charter state, it seems better, unless
its activities are substantially confined to a single state, to look to the
citizenship of individual members than to enter the litigious morass
of "principal place of business."' 176
b. The Consequence of Multiple Corporate Citizenship. Like the
present statute, the Institute's proposal defines the states of which a
corporation is to be deemed a citizen, but it is less than explicit as to the
consequence of multiple citizenship: "A corporation shall be deemed
a citizen of every State and foreign State by which it has been incorporated and of the State or foreign State where it has its principal place
of business."' 177 The commentary explains that this provision "destroys
diversity between the corporation and a citizen of any one of the specified states."' 78 It is unfortunate that the Reporters did not phrase the
statute so as to make this clear to the congressmen who will be expected
to vote on the measure and to the hurried practitioner. For the result
described by the commentary is not what the law has always been, and
in light of the complicated history of multiple corporate citizenship, the
proposal's use of the new word "every" is not without its ambiguity.
The 1958 principal-place-of-business provision did not create the
problem of multiple corporate citizenship; railroads commonly incorporated in more than one state in the nineteenth century. To indulge
in understatement, the Supreme Court's attempts to fit these creatures
into the diversity scheme left something to be desired. First, the Court
175 The ambiguity in "substantially all" is no greater than that in "principal"; the
test corresponds better to diversity policy; and, most importantly, the inquiry will only
have to be made in close cases.
176 Nothing is said about federal corporations in the ALl draft. § 1348 now makes
national banks citizens of the state where they are located; and see Feuchtwanger Corp. v.
Lake Hiawatha Federal Credit Union, 272 F.2d 453 (3d Cir. 1959), finding state citizenship
for a federal credit union despite Bouligny and the possibility of a negative inference
from § 1848. If principal place of business is to be the test, the statute should make
dear it applies to federal corporations.
177 OFFcIAL DRArT, pt. I, at 8, § 1301(b)(1).
178 Id. at 57.
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appeared to say a suit by a corporation chartered in two states was to be
regarded as brought by citizens of both, so that under Strawbridge the
corporation was never diverse to citizens of either. 7 9 Next, relying on the
old-fashioned theory that incorporation laws have no extraterritorial
force, the Court held a dual-chartered corporation to be solely a citizen
of the forum state if it was incorporated there' 8 0 Then, in a complete
about-face from its original position, the Court allowed a New Hampshire-Massachusetts corporation to sue Massachusetts defendants in a
Massachusetts federal court; apparently a multi-state corporation was
diverse to everybody."'
Not content to have announced three mutually inconsistent rules
without disowning any of them, the Supreme Court proceeded to suggest that the first incorporation was determinative; 82 that it mattered
whether the second charter had been given to individuals or to a corporation; 88 that the place the cause of action arose was, 8 4 was not, 8 5
and might be'8 6 decisive; and that an incorporation compelled as a
condition of doing business could be ignored.8 2 Then, quietly proud,
the Supreme Court retired from the field for forty-two years.
Left to their own devices, the lower courts employed the necessary
Ohio & Miss. R.R. v. Wheeler, 66 U.S. (1 Black) 286, 297, 298 (1862).
180 Railway Co. v. Whitton's Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 283-4 (1872); Muller v. Dows,
94 U.S. 444, 447-8 (1877); Memphis & C.R.R. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 581, 585 (1883).
181 Nashua & L.R.R. v. Boston & L.R.R., 136 U.S. 356, 381-2 (1890).
182 St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 560-5 (1896); Southern Ry. v. Allison,
190 U.S. 326, 332 (1903); Louisville, N.A. 8&C. Ry. v. Louisville Trust Co., 174 U.S. 552,
563 (1899). See also St. Joseph & G. Is. R.R. v. Steele, 167 U.S. 659, 663 (1897). The plaintiff
alleged it was a corporation of Kansas and Nebraska, sued a Kansas defendant in Kansas,
and was booted out of federal court. Because neither the "nature" of the corporation nor
the state of its original incorporation was alleged, the court said the case was governed by
the old Wheeler decision, supra note 179, forbidding two related corporations from joining
as plaintiffs against a citizen of either charter state.
An important antecedent of the original-incorporation cases was Pennsylvania R.R. v.
St. Louis, A. & T.H.R.R., 118 U.S. 290, 296 (1886), in which an Illinois corporation was
allowed to sue an Indiana corporation in Indiana federal court, over the defendant's
objection that the plaintiff was incorporated in Indiana as well. The Court held that
Indiana had not incorporated the railroad but had merely given the Illinois corporation
authority to operate in Indiana. "It may not be easy in all such cases to distinguish between
the purpose to create a new corporation which shall owe its existence to the law or statute
under consideration, and the intent to enable the corporation already in existence under
laws of another State to exercise its functions in the State where it is so received." Accord,
Goodlett v. Louisville & N.R.R., 122 U.S. 391, 409-10 (1887); Martin's Adm'r v. Baltimore
& O.R.R., 151 U.S. 673, 684 (1894). But James, Louisville, and Allison went further,
admitting that for some purposes there had been a second corporation.
183 St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 565 (1896).
-184 Memphis & C.R.R. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 381, 383 (1883).
185 Southern Ry. v. Allison, 190 U.S. 326, 335 (1903).
186 Patch v. Wabash R.R., 207 U.S. 277, 283 (1907).
187 Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Castle, 224 U.S. 541, 546 (1912).
179
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machete, ultimately agreeing that the order or method of incorporation
and where the case arose were immaterial and that compulsory incorporations were not to be considered.:"8 The First and Fourth Circuits
thought, in accord with some of the old Supreme Court decisions, that
the corporation was a citizen of the forum state alone if chartered
there; 8 9 the Third, thinking it absurd that a New Jersey plaintiff could
sue a New York-New Jersey corporation in federal court in New York
but not in New Jersey, held the railroad diverse to everybody in any
court.19 0
It was in this state of affairs that the Supreme Court in 1954 reviewed
the First Circuit decision in Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R.,191
refusing federal jurisdiction in Massachusetts over an action by a Massachusetts plaintiff against a Massachusetts-Connecticut corporation. The
Court played it close to the vest. Here is its full opinion: "The judgment is affirmed. Patch v. Wabash R. Co., 207 U.S. 277; Memphis &
Charleston R. Co. v. Alabama, 107 U.S. 581; Seavey v. Boston & Maine
R. Co., 197 F.2d 485." To some commentators this made everything
clear: Except for compulsory incorporations, which were to be disregarded, "if such a corporation was a party to a lawsuit in one of the
states in which it was incorporated, it would be considered, for diversity
purposes, solely a citizen of that state."'

92

This was indeed what the First Circuit had held in Seavey, but the
citation of Patch and Memphis makes it less than certain that the
Supreme Court was embracing everything said in Seavey, in view of
the suggestions in both of the former cases respecting the place the
cause of action arose-a fact that was also noted in the opinion of the
First Circuit in Jacobson itself. 93 One thing the Supreme Court unmis188

See the decisions cited in notes 189-90 infra.

Seavey v. Boston & M.R.R., 197 F.2d 485, 487 (Ist Cir. 1952); Town of Bethel v.
Atlantic C.L.R.R., 81 F.2d 60, 68, 69 (4th Cir. 1936) (both refusing jurisdiction in the state
of common citizenship); Boston & M.R.R. v. Breslin, 80 F.2d 749, 750 (Ist Cir. 1985)
(upholding jurisdiction in the charter state where the opposing party was not a citizen).
190 Gavin v. Hudson & M.R.R., 185 F.2d 104, 105-7 (1950), overruled in DiFrischia v.
New York Cent. R.R., 279 F.2d 141 (3d Cir. 1960).
191 206 F.2d 153 (1958), af'd mem., 347 U.S. 909 (1954).
192 C. WiUGr, FEDERAL CouRTs 77 & n.19 (1963); Moore & Weckstein, Corporations and
Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction:A Supreme Court Fiction Revisited, 77 HAv. L. REv.
1426, 1429 (1964). The few cases brought in states in which a multi-state company was not
189

chartered held the corporation was not diverse to a citizen of any incorporating state.
Waller v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 127 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (applying Strawbridge); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Thompson, 8 F.R.D. 96, 98 (E.D. Mo. 1948) ("In this State
the incorporating States allstand on equal footing.'); Dodd v. Louisville Bridge Co., 130
F. 186, 197 (W.D. Ky. 1904) (fuzzy, and probably alternative holding).
193 See the extensive discussion of doubts surviving Jacobson in Friedenthal, New Limitations on Federal Jurisdiction, 11 STAN. L. REV. 213, 232-5 (1959), suggesting that the
conflicting decisions may ultimately yield a principle requiring the courts to "weigh such
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takably did was to reject the Third Circuit principle that a dual corporation is always diverse to everybody. Another thing it did was
inexcusably to miss a golden opportunity to eliminate the lingering
debris.
Congress complicated matters further in 1958 by providing that a
corporation should be deemed "a citizen of any state by which it has
been incorporated and of the state where it has its principal place of
business.' 194 Legislative history excludes the possibility of holding the
corporation with principal business outside its charter state diverse to
everybody; Congress explicitly wanted to keep controversies between
such a company and citizens of its principal place of business out of
the federal court in that state. 9 5 Beyond this, however, the statute is
opaque. The courts have consistently held that when a corporation has
dual citizenship because of its place of business it is never diverse to a
citizen of its charter state; 9 6 yet some have concluded that the forum
rule still applies to multiple incorporations.97 This peculiar distinction is warranted neither by diversity policy nor by the language of the
statute, which seems to equate incorporation and principal business;
its only explanation is that to apply the forum rule to principal-business
cases would create jurisdiction of suits not cognizable before 1958 (i.e.,
suits between a Delaware citizen and a Delaware corporation in the
state of its principal business), contrary to the amendment's policy of
restricting jurisdiction." 8 If this distinction is the law, it ought to be
abolished; the ALI, though obscurely, would abolish it by destroying
the forum rule altogether.
Despite the metaphysical origins of the forum rule, it is defensible
in terms of diversity policy. In the state of common citizenship the
Strawbridge assumption works quite well for the multi-chartered corporation, for it is literally impossible to harm the foreign corporation
factors as whether the incorporation in Z was voluntary, whether Z was the first place of

incorporation, and whether the cause of action arose in Z"-as well as whether the
decision will increase or decrease diversity jurisdiction.
194 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (1964).
195 See S. RFp. No. 1830, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1958).
196 E.g., Diesing v. Vaughn Wood Products, Inc., 175 F. Supp. 460 (W.D). Va. 1959);
Harker v. Kopp, 172 F. Supp. 180 (N.D. Ill. 1959), both denying jurisdiction in the state
of principal business.
107 E.g., Majewsl~i v. New York Cent. R.R., 227 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mich. 19,64); Hudak
v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 238 F. Supp. 790 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). Cotitra, 1
J. MoqRa, FEDERAL PArcE 723.50-.58 (2d ed. 1964); 1 W. BARRON & A. HoLTzoFF, Faoam AL
PRAMEx
& PRocEuRE 142 n.93.I (Wright ed. 1960), arguing that the amendment destroys
diversity in any forum.
198 Of course, an ircrease of jurisdiction in some cases, compensated for by reductions
in other areas, is not necessarily incompatible with a statute whose purpose was to

rationalize as well as to limit jurisdictign.

1968]

Federal Jurisdiction

without hurting the local as well. But, just as in the case of multiple
individual parties, when suit is brought in a state of which only the corportation is a citizen there is nothing to protect the outside opponent
from favoritism for the partly local enterprise. However, so long as
Strawbridgeis retained in cases not involving multiple corporate citizenship, there seems no reason to make an exception for corporate cases,
and the ALI's proposal ought to be approved.
If Strawbridgewere to be overruled, there would be an argument for
retaining the forum rule so as to deny jurisdiction in multiple corporate-citizenship cases in the state of common citizenship, for the
reason indicated above; but such a rule would create complexity. Moreover, as graphically illustrated by Majewski v. New York Central
R.R.,199 the forum rule despite its basis in diversity policy is irreconcilable with the policy of trial in the most appropriate federal forum
reflected by the transfer provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). Sued by a
Michigan plaintiff in Illinois federal courts, a railroad incorporated in
both Michigan and Illinois had the action transferred to Michigan for
litigation convenience; the Michigan federal court transferred it right
back because there was diversity only in Illinois.
Simplicity would suggest, if Strawbridge were overruled, that the
multi-state corporation be made diverse to everyone; but this would
destroy Congress's commendable 1958 effort to localize the pseudoforeign corporation. It might therefore be best, if minimal diversity is
to suffice, to ignore incorporation entirely if the corporation does substantially all its business in a single state, and otherwise to allow jurisdiction whenever a corporation is voluntarily chartered by more than
one state. But this proposal again is not without complications; the only
simple way to exclude the pseudo-foreign corporation is, despite the
dent this makes in the overruling of Strawbridge, to accept the ALI
,position that a multi-state corporation is never diverse to a citizen of
any of its home states. If we must put up with diversity jurisdiction, I
would recommend this as the least disruptive course.
c. Direct Actions and Derivative Suits. The ALI, finding "sound"
the 1964 amendment to section 1332(c) that deems a liability insurer
a citizen of the state of which its insured is a citizen, as well as of its own
200
home states, incorporates this provision in its diversity proposals.
There is no merit whatever in the Senate Committee's argument that
cocitizenship between the plaintiff and the insured takes these cases
outside the purpose of the diversity grant; 20 1 Strawbridge is unconvinc199 227 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Mich. 1964).
200 OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 8-9, § 1301(b)(3).
201

S. REP. No. 1308, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1964).

The University of Chicago Law Review

[Vol. 36:1

ing enough in a case like this even when the insured cocitizen is joined
as a party, and the notion that his mere existence protects the insurer
from bias when he is not even sued is quite ridiculous. To the extent
that the direct-action provision resulted from docket pressure on the
Louisiana federal courts, the persuasive answer is to appoint more
judges 02 or to exclude all accident cases; there is nothing special about
direct actions in terms of diversity policy. Even if Strawbridge is retained, this statute should be repealed.
Abolition of Strawbridge would also eliminate the occasionally perplexing problem of realigning parties as plaintiffs or as defendants according to their real interests. Most commonly this issue arises in
shareholders' derivative suits, in which the corporation, having refused
to sue, is named as a defendant. Yet the corporation will benefit if the
plaintiff wins, for he sues to enforce a corporate claim. Accordingly,
early decisions suggested that the corporation was to be realigned as a
plaintiff unless its management was, as a later dissent put it, in the
hands of those against whom the corporate claim was asserted.20 3 Impressed by the fact that such a test might well require an extensive
investigation of the merits in order to determine jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court not long ago prescribed a simpler test: The corporation
was a defendant if management was "definitely and distinctly opposed
to the institution of this litigation. ' 20 4 The result seems to be, as predicted by the dissent, that the corporation is always a defendant in a
derivative suit; for Rule 23.1, like the familiar law on which it was
based, allows the shareholder to sue only if the corporation will not.
The opportunity for fabricating diversity therefore is enhanced: In
most large corporations it is possible to find some shareholder not a
cocitizen of the corporation or of the ultimate defendants.
The relevance of all this to diversity policy is somewhat remote. The
inquiry ought to be directed toward ascertaining whether the citizenship of the corporation is likely to have an effect upon possible bias for
or against the ultimate parties, but this is not at all easy to assess. That
the corporation will benefit from the plaintiff's victory is perhaps canceled out by the refusal of the corporation to sue; maybe the best
answer would be to assume the triers of fact will view the contest as
one entirely between the shareholder and the ultimate defendants,
so that, like the stakeholder in interpleader, the corporation's citizen202 See Weckstein, The 1964 Diversity Amendment: Congressional Indirect Action
Against State "Direct Action" Laws, 1965 Wis. L. REv. 268.
203 See, e.g., Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U.S. 579 (1905), as explained in Smith v. Sperling,
354 U.S. 91, 104 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
204 Swanson v. Traer, 354 U.S. 114, 116 (1957); Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91 (1957).
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ship should be ignored.20 5 If the corporation participates in the action,
its citizenship will become relevant, but it would not help judicial administration to postpone the determination of jurisdiction until after
trial has begun.
Like most rules respecting diversity, the realignment of corporations
in derivative suits is not terribly important. The present law is rather
dear, and that is the main thing. Overruling Strawbridgewould dispose
of the remaining alignment problems.206
5. Invoking Diversity at Home
This brings me to the three important new exceptions to diversity
jurisdiction proposed in the ALI's section 1302. The first and most
general is a provision that even when there is diverse citizenship no one
may invoke the jurisdiction in a state of which he is a citizen. 20 7 This
has long been the rule in removal cases: The defendant may remove
only if he is not a citizen of the forum state.2 8 Commentators have
often pointed out the inconsistency of forbidding the resident defendant to remove while permitting the resident plaintiff to sue in the
federal court; 20 9 and the ALl quite correctly observes that, since the
philosophy behind diversity jurisdiction is to protect the outsider, it
210
does not justify allowing the local party to sue in federal court.
I have two reservations about this logical proposal. The first is a fear
that it may lead simply to increased procedural litigation instead of
excising a substantial volume of cases from the federal courts; the
second is that in some instances the diversity policy of providing a
forum only for the help of the outsider comes into conflict with the
policy of trying cases in the most convenient forum.
Both objections can be illustrated by the example of a suit by a
Pennsylvania plaintiff against a Delaware defendant. The Institute
would permit suit to be filed in the federal court in Delaware, or in any
available state court, but not in federal court in Pennsylvania. But the
ALI does not say the case cannot be heard in the Pennsylvania federal
court. If suit is filed in a state court in Pennsylvania the defendant may
remove, and it seems not unlikely that he will since he is the party with
reason to avoid the state court. And if suit is filed in the Delaware
205 See text at notes 122-3 supra.
206 See, e.g., Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63 (1941); Reed v. Robilio, 376
F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1967).
207 OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 11.
208 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1964).
209 See, e.g., H. HART & H. WaciLaR, TH FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
898 (1953).
210 OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 68.
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federal court, the defendant may move to transfer it to the Pennsylvania
federal court. It would be unfortunate if the ALI's proposal were read
to preclude the transfer, because Pennsylvania may be by far the better
place to try the case. But if the motion is granted, or if the suit is filed
in Pennsylvania and removed, there has been a wasteful game of musical
chairs. The present rule is assuredly impossible to justify if one looks
only to the policy of providing a forum for the out-of-state litigant, but
it makes a good deal of sense because it simplifies the task of judicial
administration.
The ALI's second suggestion along these lines is that a commuter be
211
forbidden to invoke diversity jurisdiction in the state where he works.
This is not to make him a citizen of both states, for the commentary
expressly reserves the right of a citizen of his work state to sue him in
the federal court where the commuter lives.212 The rationale is that the
man who works in New York or Philadelphia is not likely to be the
victim of prejudice in the courts of New York or Pennsylvania just
213
because he goes back to Jersey to sleep.

This assessment is hard to quibble with, but I oppose the proposal.
First, it will have a merry-go-round effect like that of the first suggestion
discussed above. It is true that when the commuter sues a New Yorker
in New York there can be no removal; but removal is probable whenever the defendant is not a citizen or commuter of the forum state.
Moreover, the New Yorker can go to New Jersey to sue the commuter in
the federal court, and the convenient forum may be New York. The
ALI would forbid transfer to New York because neither party could
have invoked original jurisdiction there; 214 this tying of transfer to
original jurisdiction is faithful to the bias rationale but hard to reconcile with section 1404(a). Nor is it an answer that transfer is already
limited to courts in which the suit might have been brought. That
limitation can itself be criticized; but the existing limitations are venue
and perhaps also personal jurisdiction, which at least purport to reflect
215
the same convenience policy as section 1404 itself.

211 OFFICIAL DRAFr, pt. I, at 12, § 1302(c). To protect the person who "has his principal
place of business or employment in another state for a limited time," see id. at 75, the ALI
requires that the relationship be maintained for "more than two years." And, to assure
"an alien's right of access to a federal court," the provision applies only to United States

citizens. Id.
212 Id.
213 Id. at 75-76. Here the ALI abandons what it earlier urged, see text at notes 26-40
supra, as a principal justification for diversity jurisdiction: "It may be true that state
justice has shortcomings which the commuter cannot as a practical matter do anything to
correct, but the in-stater who works by his side is not significantly more likely to have
an effective voice in the matter."
214 Id. at 17-18, 19-20, §§ 1305(b), 1306(a).
215 See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335 (1960); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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The commuter provision does seem to present fewer construction
problems than many of the ALI proposals, but there may be some
trouble in determining whether a state is the party's "principal" place
of employment. If he is proprietor of a business he will also be covered
by the next exception to be considered, and he may be barred without
deciding whether his principal business is in the forum state. If he is
the ordinary desk or factory employee with only one job the task is
easy. But what if he works eight hours in New York by day and eight
more in New Jersey at night? What if he is a salesman whose territory
is the metropolitan area? A construction worker who spends considerable time in two or more states? I oppose the commuter provision as an
unnecessary, litigation-provoking complication that is not worth the
trouble. If we are to have diversity jurisdiction we should make it as
workable as possible by adhering to the simplest test of residence that
we can devise, and without complications.
The third exception in draft section 1302 is to forbid a corporation
or other business to invoke federal jurisdiction in any state where it has
a "local establishment." 2 6 This in my view is the most unfortunate as
well as the most significant of the ALI's proposals. It is in discussing this
section that the Reporters make their statement, quoted at the beginning of this paper, about the desirability of a clear test for jurisdiction; 217 it is in drafting this section that the Reporters most singularly

fail to live up to their own exhortation.
They do produce a most gruesome catalogue of specific definitions
of established place of business. A more arbitrary set of rules could
scarcely be devised; the Institute would distinguish, among other things,
between the buying and the selling of goods in a state because only the
latter brings the business into substantial contact with the public.

21 8

But the most striking fact about these horrible specifics is that they
leave enormous gray zones that will plague the courts with additional
problems of construction. There is a provision that one is not to be
held to have a local establishment because of the activities of an "independent commission agent, broker, or custodian." Does this adopt the
variable and intensely factual test for distinguishing between servants
and independent contractors? Or does it import a new and equally vague
doctrine whose contours are not yet even suggested? The exception
applies only to "entities organized or operated primarily for the pur216 OFFICIAL DRAFT, pt. I, at 11-12, § 1302(b). The provision applies only to organizations
incorporated or having their principal business in the United States, and the establishment
must have been maintained for over two years.
217 Id. at 72.
218 Id. at 71. The draft also distinguishes between selling concerns maintaining a stock of
goods within the state and those filling orders of local salesmen from outside, "consistent
with the emphasis on visible competition with local enterprise." Id.
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pose of conducting a trade, investment, or other business enterprise" in
order to permit "charitable, religious, or educational institutions, ...
labor unions and fraternal societies" to invoke jurisdiction where they
have an established place of activity. 219 If it were not for this explicit
commentary I would have thought the test of "business" broad enough
to include education unless it is given away free. Is the test to be the
type of activity engaged in, or has "business" to do with the making of
profit only?
Finally, even if the specific and numerous definitions present no
other ambiguities, 220 there is the impossible requirement that the action
be one "arising out of the activities" of the local establishment. The
Reporters helpfully advise us that this test is more restrictive than a
prior formulation that would have excluded actions "related to" the
establishment, 221 but no attempt is made to define either phrase. Nor is
it very clear why there should be any such limitation. None is proposed
for the commuter; the difference is puzzling, since the basis of both
provisions is that the established worker or business needs no protection
against local bias. The explanation is the desire to limit the risks of
litigation that a business takes when establishing a foreign place of
business; 222 but why the Reporters feel the need of this limit is obscure,
since they think the corporation is in no danger of bias.
Further, even if the proposal were not both arbitrarily detailed and
litigation-breeding, it would be questionable in terms of the bias policy.
It is hardly credible that a substantial bias against a foreign business
is destroyed because it sets up a local store; surely the presence of a
wholly-owned newsstand in Birmingham would not help the New York
Times very much in an Alabama court. Indeed one of the original
reasons for diversity jurisdiction, we are told, was the attraction of
capital from other states; 223 not only does this suggest that corporations
should be treated as citizens, since they are a principal means of investing capital, but it also indicates that the man who invests money in
another state may need protection.
Finally, if I agreed with the Institute that a corporation should not
be allowed to sue in its place of established business, I would suggest
that the statute abolish the second category of principal place of
business. There seems no excuse for two levels of difficult threshold
determination even before we get to venue and service of process. My
Id. at 74.
See id. at 73, leaving the question of subsidiary corporations to be decided "in light
of the particular facts."
221 Id. at 73.
222 Id. at 72-73.
223 Id. at 49.
219
220
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suggestion would be, if I agreed with the ALI on this, that a corporation
be made a citizen of every state where it did business.
This painfully long discussion gives an idea of the enormous infrastructure that has grown up to support and to define the diversity jurisdiction. In my view the security given out-of-state interests by this
jurisdiction is not worth the burden of defining and administering it.
But the American Law Institute, rather than proposing to simplify the
jurisdictional determination, is intent upon complicating it. I dissent.

